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ABSTRACT
Anglo-American theorists of the criminal law have concentrated
on—one is tempted to say “obsessed over”—the distinction between
justification and excuse for a good quarter-century and the scholarly
attention has purchased unusually widespread agreement.
Justification defenses are said to apply when the actor’s conduct was
not morally wrongful; excuse defenses lie when the actor did engage
in wrongful conduct but is not morally blameworthy. A nearconsensus thus achieved, theorists have turned to subordinate matters,
joining issue most notably on the question of whether justifications
are “subjective”—turning upon the actor’s reasons for acting—or
“objective”—involving only facts independent of the actor’s beliefs
and motives.
This Article seeks to demonstrate that the prevailing understanding
is wrong. Drawing on the well-known distinction between conduct
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rules and decision rules, it argues that the distinction between
justification and excuse, for purposes of a criminal law taxonomy, is
only this: A justified action is not criminal, whereas an excused
defendant has committed a criminal act but is not punishable. To
readers only marginally acquainted with the relevant literature, this
claim may seem far from extravagant, for occasional statements to the
same effect can be found in the case law and commentary. In fact,
however, theorists have not appreciated just how this articulation of
the distinction differs from the orthodox one, nor what consequences
follow. This Article attempts to remedy that defect.
One lesson of a systematic investigation into these competing
formulations is that the long-running debate over whether
justifications, properly understood, are “subjective” or “objective” is
misconceived. This is a debate over policy broadly conceived, not (as
it so often purports to be) a matter of conceptual analysis. More
generally, this Article’s examination of justification and excuse
constitutes a case study in the complex relationship between legal and
moral reasoning, and highlights the importance of distinguishing
arguments that advance substantive value judgments from those that
purport to analyze our conceptual apparatus. It may be that
conceptual analysis is no less contestable or value-laden than is
substantive normative argument (though perhaps it is). In any event,
they are not the very same enterprise and a first step to clear
thinking—in the criminal law and elsewhere—is to keep them distinct.
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INTRODUCTION
Scholarship, like all human artifacts, has its fashions. In the field
of Anglo-American criminal law theory perhaps no subject has been
more in vogue the past twenty-odd years than the distinction between
justification and excuse. Most responsible for this upsurge in scholarly
interest are Professors George Fletcher and Paul Robinson, who
1
debated the subject in 1975, and who have written repeatedly on the
topic ever since. But Fletcher and Robinson are now in crowded
company. Indeed, the full list of contributors to the topic reads like a
Who’s Who of contemporary criminal law theorists on both sides of
the Atlantic.2
This outpouring of scholarly attention has appeared to pay
dividends, as the distinction between justification and excuse has
become one of the rare subjects on which scholars have reached wide
agreement, essentially echoing Fletcher’s view that “[a] justification
negates an assertion of wrongful conduct. An excuse negates a charge
that the particular defendant is personally to blame for the wrongful

1. Compare Paul H. Robinson, A Theory of Justification: Societal Harm as a Prerequisite
for Criminal Liability, 23 UCLA L. REV. 266 (1975) (defending a purely objective theory of
justification), with George Fletcher, The Right Deed for the Wrong Reason: A Reply to Mr.
Robinson, 23 UCLA L. REV. 293 (1975) (arguing that full justifications must be both subjective
and objective). Fletcher in particular is widely credited for having put the justification/excuse
distinction on the contemporary scholarly agenda. See Joshua Dressler, Justifications and
Excuses: A Brief Overview of the Concepts in the Literature, 33 WAYNE L. REV. 1155, 1159 &
n.13 (1987) (citing authorities).
2. The list of Anglo-American scholars who have written on the subject includes (though
is hardly limited to) Larry Alexander, Joshua Dressler, John Gardner, Kent Greenawalt,
Jeremy Horder, Heidi Hurd, Douglas Husak, Sanford Kadish, Michael Moore, J.C. Smith, and
Jeremy Waldron. Relevant works are cited infra passim. This Article does not explore
continental approaches to the justification/excuse distinction.
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conduct.” In fact, at a recent meeting of the Criminal Law Section of
the American Association of Law Schools, Joshua Dressler cited
theorists’ resolution of the justification/excuse problem as the leading
illustration of the successes that criminal law theory has achieved over
the past couple of decades.4 The solidity of this consensus has freed
theorists to focus on subordinate questions, joining issue most notably
on the question of whether justifications are “subjective”—turning
upon the actor’s reasons for acting—or “objective”—involving only
5
facts independent of the actor’s beliefs and motives.
I believe that the prevailing consensus is wrong. Instead, I argue,
the distinction between justification and excuse for purposes of
taxonomizing criminal law defenses is only this: A justified action is
not criminal, whereas an excused defendant has committed a crime
but is not punishable. To readers only marginally acquainted with the
relevant literature, this claim might seem far from extravagant, for
occasional statements to the same effect can be found in the case law
6
and commentary. Despite such statements, however, this view has
wanted for systematic development. Indeed, theorists have seemingly
not appreciated just how this formulation of the distinction differs
from the orthodox one, nor what consequences follow.
This Article attempts to remedy that defect. It proceeds as
follows. Part I first presents the prevailing conceptualization of the
justification/excuse distinction in contemporary criminal law
scholarship—what I term the “substantive equivalence thesis.” It then
criticizes this view by showing that persons who engage in morally
justified conduct may not be justified in law, and that criminal
defenses most plausibly denominated as justifications extend to
morally unjustified conduct.
3. George P. Fletcher, The Right and the Reasonable, 98 HARV. L. REV. 949, 958 (1985);
see also, e.g., GEORGE FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW 759 (1978) (“Claims of
justification concede that the definition of the offense is satisfied, but challenge whether the act
is wrongful; claims of excuse concede that the act is wrongful, but seek to avoid the attribution
of the act to the actor.”).
4. Joshua Dressler, What is the Point of Teaching and Scholarship in Criminal Law and
Procedure?, Presentation at the American Association of Law Schools Conference on Criminal
Justice, Washington, D.C. (June 11, 2000); cf. Alafair S. Burke, Rational Actors, Self-Defense,
and Duress: Making Sense, Not Syndromes, Out of the Battered Woman, 81 N.C. L. REV. 211,
218 n.19 (2002) (describing the justification/excuse distinction as constituting “a vital strain of
the scholarly literature”).
5. For a sound overview of the subjective/objective debate, see Russell L. Christopher,
Mistake of Fact in the Objective Theory of Justification: Do Two Rights Make Two Wrongs Make
Two Rights . . . ?, 85 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 295, 295–303 (1994).
6. See infra notes 38–40 and accompanying text.
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Part II introduces and defends a competing account—the
“structural equivalence thesis”—pursuant to which justifications and
excuses play the same role in the structural logic of moral and legal
reasoning, even though their substantive content may differ.
Specifically, a justification serves to qualify a norm of behavior by
providing that one who is justified does not violate the governing
norm; an excuse serves to release one who has violated a norm from
some or all of the consequences that ordinarily attach to the norm
violation. One question this conceptualization raises is how to
determine whether any given defense is more properly categorized as
conferring permission (thus serving as a “justification”) or as making
an offender unpunishable (thus serving as an “excuse”). This Part
argues that the language of the governing statute is not conclusive
and that the answer is instead a sociological fact (potentially difficult
to discover and inherently contestable) about that particular criminal
law regime.
The question of whether there exist any intrinsic or natural
substantive constraints on the classification of defenses as
justifications or excuses is further pursued in Part III, which takes up
the long-running debate over whether justifications must be
“subjective” or “objective.” I argue that this is principally a debate
over policy broadly conceived, not—as it so often purports to be—a
matter of conceptual analysis. In developing this argument, this Part
pays particular, and critical, attention to the most important and
theoretically ambitious proposal for comprehensive criminal law
7
reform of recent years—Paul Robinson’s draft codes.
Part IV explores two further implications of the structural
equivalence thesis. It shows, contrary to prevailing wisdom, that
proper conceptualization of the justification/excuse distinction by
itself generates no particular consequences for the permissibility of
assistance or interference by third parties. It also argues that trying to
classify existing defenses—like self-defense and protection of
property—is a perilous enterprise insofar as these putative defenses
are really defense clusters, not discrete defenses. With this caveat in
mind, the final Part nonetheless offers some thoughts about the
proper classification of duress and provocation.
All of this is in service of a broader ambition. That ambition is
not, however, to demonstrate just how important the
7. See generally PAUL H. ROBINSON, STRUCTURE AND FUNCTION IN THE CRIMINAL
LAW (1997).
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justification/excuse distinction is for purposes of marking legal, as
distinct from moral, categories. To be sure, so long as scholars are
going to employ it, it’s important that they get the distinction right.
But whether they should employ it at all is a separate question, one
about which I’m frankly skeptical. Rather, by highlighting the
difference between conceptual and normative reasoning in this one
heavily mined context, I hope to focus scholars’ attention on the
importance of distinguishing their substantive, normative arguments
from their conceptual or logical ones. This lesson—which does not
presuppose that arguments of the latter sort are purely “factual,” and
thus does not depend upon a strong version of the fact/value
distinction—can pay dividends not just for theorists of the criminal
law, but across domains of legal scholarship.
I. MORAL THEORY AND THE SUBSTANTIVE EQUIVALENCE THESIS
Contemporary criminal law scholarship commonly sorts defenses
into three broad classes: justifications, excuses, and a third category
variously termed defenses of law enforcement policy, or
8
“nonexculpatory defenses,” or the like. Although core instances of
each category are readily identified without the need for an explicitly
agreed-upon definition—necessity is a justification, insanity is an
excuse, the statute of limitations is a policy defense—scholars have
9
struggled to fine-tune these distinctions. In particular, a vast

8. See, e.g., Paul H. Robinson, Criminal Law Defenses: A Systematic Analysis, 82 COLUM.
L. REV. 199, 229–32 (1982) (terming the third category of defenses “nonexculpatory defenses”);
cf. SANFORD H. KADISH, BLAME AND PUNISHMENT: ESSAYS IN THE CRIMINAL LAW 82 (1987)
(categorizing defenses as based on law enforcement policy or culpability, with culpability
defenses including the two subcategories of justification and excuse); MICHAEL S. MOORE,
PLACING BLAME 482 (1997) (dividing defenses, first, “between extrinsic policy defences and
culpability defences,” and then subdividing the latter into justifications and excuses).
9. Any general comments about common doctrinal defenses like “necessity” risk
miscommunication because the term is familiar to all criminal lawyers but differs in precise
content across jurisdictions. When speaking of necessity, I will be referring to the “lesser evils”
defense, no matter the source of the danger. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.02(1)(a) (1962)
(“Conduct that the actor believes to be necessary to avoid a harm or evil to himself or to
another is justifiable, provided that . . . the harm or evil sought to be avoided by such conduct is
greater than that sought to be prevented by the law defining the offense charged.”). I use
“duress” in a generic sense to refer to situations in which the defendant acted in the face of
substantial pressures but did not choose the lesser evil. The precise extent and manner in which
this sense of duress is realized in actual doctrine—such as whether it extends to “duress of
circumstances” as well as to do-it-or-else commands issued by another person, and whether it is
available in homicide cases—are matters of positive law with regard to which my references to
“duress” simpliciter are intended to remain flexible.
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literature has developed concerning justification and excuse,
exploring such questions as the practical implications of the
distinction, and which doctrinal defenses belong in which category.
However, the chief concern of contributors—and the logically prior
one—has been to identify the conceptual difference between these
two categories of defense.
A. The Standard Account
A first cut at the difference between justification and excuse
starts by recognizing that, unlike the third category of nonexculpatory
policy defenses, “justification” and “excuse” are not uniquely legal
terms. According to the standard account in ethics, justified action is
not wrongful whereas excused action is wrongful conduct for which
10
the actor is not “morally responsible,” in the particular sense of not
being blameworthy.11 It is not surprising therefore that the standard

10. “Responsible” is a notoriously ambiguous term in normative discourse. (For the classic
taxonomy, see generally H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY 211–30 (1968). An
important recent examination, in part critical of Hart’s account, is PETER CANE,
RESPONSIBILITY IN LAW AND MORALITY (2002).) Thus, I cannot exclude the possibility that I
have misinterpreted some authors’ unqualified or unelaborated references to “responsibility” or
“moral responsibility.” Nonetheless, I am reasonably confident that the statement in text fairly
represents what authors mean by “responsible” in this context.
11. The locus classicus of this distinction (albeit of modern vintage) is J.L. Austin, A Plea
for Excuses, in 57 PROCEEDINGS OF THE ARISTOTELIAN SOCIETY 1 (1956–57). See, e.g., id. at 2
(“In the one defence, briefly, we accept responsibility but deny that it was bad: in the other, we
admit that it was bad but don’t accept full, or even any, responsibility.”). For a recent
exploration of some of the philosophical issues concerning justification and excuse, see
SUZANNE UNIACKE, PERMISSIBLE KILLING: THE SELF-DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION OF HOMICIDE
9–30 (1994).
On the view described in the text, to reiterate, no conduct is all-things-considered
wrongful, yet justified because the presence of a justification renders presumptively or
seemingly wrongful conduct not wrongful. See John Gardner, In Defence of Defences, in
FLORES JURIS ET LEGUM: FESTSKRIFT TILL NILS JAREBORG 1 (Uppsala: Iustus Forlag 2002),
available at http://users.ox.ac.uk/~lawf0081/defences.pdf (last visited Sept. 9, 2003) (on file with
the Duke Law Journal) (“According to the ‘closure’ view, no action is wrong unless it is wrong
all things considered, i.e. taking account of both the reasons in favour of performing it (the pros)
and the reasons against performing it (the cons).”). On a minority view powerfully developed by
Martha Nussbaum and recently endorsed by John Gardner, a justification qualifies wrongdoing
but does not extinguish it: wrongful but justified conduct remains wrongful (albeit far preferable
to wrongful and unjustified conduct). See MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, THE FRAGILITY OF
GOODNESS: LUCK AND ETHICS IN GREEK TRAGEDY AND PHILOSOPHY 25–50 (1986); Gardner,
supra, at 3. Because the former view—what Gardner dubs “the closure view”—is so
predominant, and because to attempt an even minimally adequate defense of it would
significantly expand an already long Article, I will assume it here without giving the competing
position the attention it doubtlessly deserves.
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account among criminal law theorists follows identical lines: A
defense is a justification if it renders the actor’s conduct not morally
wrongful, whereas it is an excuse if it renders morally wrongful
12
conduct not blameworthy. (See Figure 1.) This view is captured also,
Two quick points, though. First, although Gardner is surely right that some duties—most
especially the duty to show regret—arise from justified actions, id. at 7–8, this is not, I think,
because the justified action remains wrongful. Rather, it’s because the justified action has
produced some unfortunate state of affairs (such as injury to another person) about which it is a
mark of decency, and perhaps a duty of empathy, to feel regret. Tellingly, this duty to express
regret arises even from conduct that (on most accounts) is not wrongful at all—such as
nonnegligently causing injury to a negligent victim. Precisely for this reason, I think, Nussbaum
takes pains to argue that justified wrongdoing is “occasion not only for regret but for an
emotion more like remorse.” NUSSBAUM, supra, at 27. Presumably, that is, a duty to feel and
show remorse tracks wrongdoing: it does not exist absent wrongdoing and it cannot be mooted
by justification. See id. at 43 (stating that the expression of remorse, unlike mere regret, is an
admission of a defective action). I am just not persuaded that Nussbaum proves out either
component of this two-part claim. What Nussbaum’s subtle analysis does show, it seems to me,
is that one’s failure to experience appropriate emotions and attitudes when faced with a moral
conflict can make one blameworthy. See, e.g., id. at 33 (describing, as “the central theme in the
Chorus’s blame of Agamemnon,” that “he adopted an inappropriate attitude towards his
conflict, killing a human child with no more agony, no more revulsion of feeling, than if she had
indeed been an animal of a different species”). Of course, this does not entail that the killing, if
justified, remained wrong.
Second, I do not believe that the central claims of this Article depend upon acceptance of
the “closure” conception of wrongdoing and justification. Although I defend a different
conception of the justification/excuse distinction than does Gardner, see infra note 124 and
accompanying text, it seems to me that his rejection of the closure view of justification does not,
by itself, threaten either the structural equivalence thesis set forth in Part II of this Article, or
the implications of that thesis spelled out in Parts III and IV. Again, however, I acknowledge
that this contention is asserted but not defended.
12. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE, Introduction to Art. 3, at 2–3 (1985) (observing that
“the Code makes a rough analytical distinction between excuse and justification as defenses to a
criminal prosecution,” seeming to map that distinction onto the “ordinar[y]” view that justified
conduct “is thought to be right, or at least not undesirable” and that excused conduct “is
thought to be undesirable but that for some reason the actor is not to be blamed for it,” and
expressing “skepticism that any fine line between excuse and justification can sensibly be
drawn” due to the presence of “troublesome borderline cases”); MOORE, supra note 8, at 483:
[J]ustifications answer a different moral question than do excuses. . . .
. . . When an action is justified, any prima facie wrongfulness is eliminated by the
other (and good) attributes of the action; when an action is excused, it is still wrongful
but the actor cannot be held responsible for it because she is not culpable.
ALAN NORRIE, CRIME, REASON, AND HISTORY 154 (1993) (“[A]s a justification . . . . no wrong
act has been done. . . . As an excuse . . . the focus moves from the question of the value of the
act to the position, condition or circumstances of the actor and their effect on his culpability.”);
Laurence A. Alexander, Justification and Innocent Aggressors, 33 WAYNE L. REV. 1177, 1177
(1987) (stating excuse lies when the actor is “absolve[d] . . . of responsibility,” while justification
lies when the actor engaged in “the morally correct action”); Burke, supra note 4, at 242–43
(“Justification defenses operate when the defendant’s act is the morally preferred option. . . . In
contrast, excuse defenses apply when the act itself is harmful, but when something about the
actor relieves her of moral culpability for the wrongful act.”); Joshua Dressler, New Thoughts
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if imperfectly, by the maxim that criminal justifications speak to the
13
act, whereas excuses speak to the actor.
Figure 1

Justification
Excuse

The Standard Account
Morality
Criminal Law
Act not wrongful
Act not wrongful
Act wrongful but Actor Act wrongful but Actor
not blameworthy
not blameworthy

About the Concept of Justification in the Criminal Law: A Critique of Fletcher’s Thinking and
Rethinking, 32 UCLA L. REV. 61, 66 (1984) (“[A] justified act indicates at least that the
conduct is not wrongful; an excuse concedes the wrongfulness of the act, but asserts that the
actor should not be punished for her wrongful behavior, primarily because of psychological or
situational involuntariness.” (footnotes omitted)); Kent Greenawalt, The Perplexing Borders of
Justification and Excuse, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1897, 1897 (1984) (“If A’s claim is that what he did
was fully warranted . . . A offers a justification; if A acknowledges he acted wrongfully but
claims he was not to blame . . . he offers an excuse.”); Heidi M. Hurd, Justification and Excuse,
Wrongdoing and Culpability, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1551, 1558 (1999) (“Justified actions
should be conceived of as right actions, while excused actions should be conceived of as wrong
actions done nonculpably.”); Dan M. Kahan & Martha C. Nussbaum, Two Conceptions of
Emotion in Criminal Law, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 269, 318–19 (1996) (“Justifications are said to
identify acts that produce morally preferred states of affairs. . . . Excuses, in contrast, are said to
identify circumstances in which an act is wrongful but the actor blameless.” (footnotes
omitted)); David A.J. Richards, Self-Defense and Relations of Domination: Moral and Legal
Perspectives on Battered Women Who Kill: Introduction, 57 U. PITT. L. REV. 461, 462 (1996)
(“[A] person entitled to the defense [of justification], otherwise guilty of legal wrongdoing, has
done nothing wrong. In contrast, a defense of excuse . . . does not negative the wrongdoing of
the act, but focuses on the lack of culpability of the offender . . . .”).
The “not blameworthy” formulation applies, of course, to “full excuses.” In cases of
partial excuse, the actor is deemed (merely) “less blameworthy”—i.e., less blameworthy than is
supposed paradigmatic for that offense.
13. See, e.g., 1 PAUL ROBINSON, CRIMINAL LAW DEFENSES 100–01 (1984):
Justified conduct is correct behavior that is encouraged or at least tolerated. In
determining whether conduct is justified, the focus is on the act, not the actor. An
excuse represents a legal conclusion that the conduct is wrong, undesirable, but that
criminal liability is inappropriate because some characteristic of the actor vitiates
society’s desire to punish him. . . . The focus in excuses is on the actor.
Michael D. Bayles, Reconceptualizing Necessity and Duress, 33 WAYNE L. REV. 1191, 1203
(1987):
Generally, justifications admit that conduct satisfies the definition of an offense but
the conduct is not wrongful since such conduct is justifiable in the totality of
circumstances. Justifications focus on acts. . . .
Excuses, on the other hand, admit that an actor’s conduct is wrongful but we can not
properly hold the actor responsible for his behavior. Excuses focus on the actor.
FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 3, at 458–59.
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This supposed distinction has provoked criminal law scholars to
investigate nice moral questions. Two questions have predominated
in the literature. First, is wrongfulness determined “subjectively” in
terms of the actor’s reasons for acting, or “objectively” in terms of
facts independent of the actor’s beliefs and motives—usually such
facts as whether her deed in fact produces a net societal benefit or at
least produces no socially recognized loss? Put another way, does
14
wrongfulness depend upon “reasons” or “deeds”? Second, if
wrongfulness is determined subjectively, is it true that actions are
“justified” when the act is merely permissible, or must it be morally
right?15
These are, to be sure, interesting questions of moral theory. But,
precisely for that reason, they do not speak to the logically prior issue
with which we are here interested—namely, the nature of the
conceptual distinction between justification and excuse for purposes
of the criminal law. Insofar as that is our interest, we can safely
bracket these much-debated questions of ethics. For, I shall argue, the
distinction between justification and excuse, as concepts relevant to
14. This opposition has been couched in a variety of ways. Most frequently, the line is
drawn between subjective and objective theories of justification, e.g., Greenawalt, supra note 12,
at 1915–18, or reasons versus deeds, Paul H. Robinson, Competing Theories of Justification:
Deeds vs. Reasons, in HARM AND CULPABILITY 45 (A.P. Simester & A.T.H. Smith eds., 1996).
Other theorists speak in terms of agent-perspectival and objective theories, UNIACKE, supra
note 11, at 17 & n.16; epistemic and non-epistemic theories, Hurd, supra note 12; and
approaches based on explanatory reasons or guiding reasons, John Gardner, Justifications and
Reasons, in HARM AND CULPABILITY, supra, at 103–06.
I take all these formulations to aim at roughly the same distinction, namely that
justifications could depend either on an actor’s reasons for engaging in a prima facie wrong
(even if those reasons are based on mistaken beliefs about the relevant facts), or on the actual
state of affairs that the actor brings about. It is true that, by their plain terms, some of the
pairings appear to contrast objective facts with the actor’s beliefs, whereas others contrast
objective facts with the actor’s motives. This is a difference because even if A shoots B actually
believing that if she does not then B will shoot C, it is possible that such a belief plays no part in
motivating or explaining her decision to shoot B. But I assume that those non-objective
approaches which formally turn on an actor’s beliefs and not on her reasons recognize that her
explanatory reasons are what matter and speak in terms of beliefs only because it’s a more
easily administered proxy. To signal that the conception of justification I defend can turn upon
beliefs, reasons, objective facts, or on some combination of the three, I will generally refer
interchangeably to “subjective” and “reasons” approaches on the one hand, and to “objective”
and “deeds” theories on the other. To simplify, subjective and reasons theories of justification
care about an actor’s beliefs; objective and deeds theories do not.
15. See, e.g., UNIACKE, supra note 11, at 9–56, 130–55 (contrasting permissible self-defense
with permissible and moral self-defense); Dressler, supra note 12, at 81–87 (arguing that
justifiable conduct is not just tolerable, but right in a moral sense); Greenawalt, supra note 12, at
1904 (discussing the moral difficulty in claiming that less than ideal but still permissible acts
are justified).
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the criminal law, cannot simply replicate or mirror the distinction that
obtains in moral theory: the categories of morally and criminally
justified conduct constitute overlapping but distinct sets.
B. The Standard Account Rebutted
Rebuttal of the standard account is straightforward. First, it is
empirically false that the categories of morally and criminally justified
conduct are extensionally identical. Second, there appears no basis
for concluding that the extensional divergence is produced by any sort
of conceptual error. Naturally, it remains open for one to argue that,
for reasons of policy broadly construed, the substantive criminal law
should be structured in such a way as to extend justification defenses
to all, and to only, such conduct as is morally justified. Likewise, one
could reasonably argue that the law should extend excuse defenses to
all, and to only, such conduct as is morally excused. But any such
arguments would be wholly normative; they provide no guidance for
understanding the conceptual framework of defenses in those
jurisdictions (probably all of them) that resist this advice.
1. Not All Morally Justified Conduct Is Criminally Justified.
Consider some familiar candidates for morally justified civil
disobedience—say, the civil rights sit-ins, or medically indicated use
of marijuana by severely ill persons, or distribution of hypodermic
needles to drug addicts in order to combat the spread of AIDS, or the
disruption of abortion clinics.16 In none of these cases is the defendant
likely to have a valid legal defense. When the legislature can be
understood to have already anticipated such possible claims of
necessity, and nonetheless to have adopted, or refused to modify, a
17
criminal ban, the necessity defense does not lie. And with good
reason. As the commentary to the Model Penal Code (MPC)
explains, the necessity defense carves out an across-the-board
exception for those unanticipated circumstances in which the
legislature would not want a general prohibition to apply.18 It is

16. Actual cases involving these situations are discussed in SANFORD H. KADISH &
STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES 865–67 (6th ed. 1995).
17. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.02(1)(c) (1962) (extending the necessity defense
only so long as “a legislative purpose to exclude the justification claimed does not . . .
plainly appear”).
18. Id. § 3.02(1) cmt. at 13; see also United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers’ Coop., 532
U.S. 483, 491 (2001) (“Under any conception of legal necessity, one principle is clear: The
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therefore implicitly rejected for those circumstances that might have
been more specifically accommodated, but were not. Consequently,
in any of the above circumstances, a defendant’s only hope for
exculpation lies formally outside the doctrinal parameters of the
substantive criminal law, as through the exercise of prosecutorial
discretion or jury nullification. At least some morally justified
19
conduct, it seems, is not criminally justified.
Advocates of the standard conceptualization of justifications
could perhaps respond as follows: Even if many unlawful acts
(perhaps or perhaps not including any of those listed above) are
morally justified absent a legal prohibition, such acts cannot be
morally justified in the face of a legal ban, given the moral imperative
to obey the criminal law.
Yet this response fails. First, the theory of political obligation
upon which this attempt to save the substantive equivalence thesis
rests is implausible. Let us suppose that, in any morally legitimate
political system, criminal rules assume some moral force simply by
virtue of their adoption, and that the mere existence of a criminal ban
is therefore a consideration to be taken into account in the overall
moral calculus. Nonetheless, very few legal or political theorists
believe that the mere existence of a legal ban necessarily renders
morally unjustified all action that would be morally justified in the
20
strong sense absent the legal prohibition. Even if the existence of a
criminal ban on given conduct always provides a reason not to engage
in that conduct, and even if it would often constitute a reason of
overriding force not to engage in it, for purposes of moral as opposed
to legal analysis, it does not provide a necessarily decisive reason not
to engage in it.
Furthermore, the response fares no better even were we to adopt
an account of political obligation pursuant to which disobedience to
law is always and necessarily morally wrongful. True, this account

defense cannot succeed when the legislature itself has made a ‘determination of values.’”
(quoting 1 W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 5.4, at 629 (1986))).
19. I hope it is obvious that I am taking no position on which, if any, of the offered
candidates for moral justification are actually morally justified under the best moral theory. If
you think that none of these actions would be morally justified, feel free to supply your own
favorite example of what you consider to be morally justified civil disobedience. The point will
remain the same.
20. For a clear and concise recent summary of the debate, see Leslie Green, Law and
Obligations, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 514
(Jules Coleman & Scott Shapiro eds., 2001).
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would seem to nullify the set of morally justified action that is
criminal and not justified in law. But it does so as a mere tautology; it
tells us nothing about the nature of justification defenses in the
criminal law, which is precisely what criminal law theorists who mine
this terrain are purporting to explore. Consequently, even if we are
prepared to accept the strong version of political obligation, I think
that criminal law theorists who equate justifications of morality with
justifications of criminal law must be understood to be referring to
what morality commands or permits as a pre-legal matter. They are
not referring to what morality permits as a function of a substantive
theory of political obligation married to the contingencies of what
defenses the criminal law happens to confer. Contrary to the standard
account, then, there can be morally justified actions that are not
legally justified.21
2. Not All Criminally Justified Conduct Is Morally Justified. A
simple hypothetical demonstrates that the converse is true as well:
Not all criminally justified conduct is morally justified.
Imagine an actor, Albert, who employs deadly force in selfdefense in circumstances in which completely safe retreat would have
been easy. (To make matters more stark, assume if you like that the
assailant, Bushrod, was old, deranged, and physically disabled, and
21. As Austin put the point:
Suppose an act innocuous, or positively beneficial, be prohibited by the sovereign
under the penalty of death; if I commit this act, I shall be tried and condemned, and if
I object to the sentence, that it is contrary to the law of God . . . . the Court of Justice
will demonstrate the inconclusiveness of my reasoning by hanging me up, in
pursuance of the law of which I have impugned the validity.
JOHN AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED, Lecture V, at 133–34 (David
Campbell and Philip Thomas eds., 1995) (1832).
To be sure, the principle “lex injusta non est lex” (an unjust law is not a law) would
seemingly entail that the putative law which denies a defense in cases of moral justification is
not a “law” at all. Obviously, I cannot in this space seek to rebut this particular sort of natural
law theory. But an extended discussion is probably unnecessary given the very real doubt that
any modern theorist of natural law accepts this maxim. See generally Brian H. Bix, Natural Law:
The Modern Tradition, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF
LAW, supra note 20, at 61. And even if that’s not so, I am unaware of any proponent of the
standard account of the justification/excuse distinction who defends that view as nothing more
than a corollary of the lex injusta principle. Perhaps this is in part because the principle, even
were it sound, would still not be quite enough to maintain the standard account; its adherents
would still have to confront the challenge to be discussed in the immediately following
subsection. That is, they would have to explain either why a criminal law that extends a defense
in cases of morally unjustified conduct is also not a “law,” or why such defenses cannot count as
a “justification” even as a matter of legal taxonomy. See infra notes 22–29 and
accompanying text.
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that Albert concedes after the fact that he was aware of the
22
opportunity for safe retreat at the time.) If this occurred in one of
the many jurisdictions that does not require retreat (especially from
23
the actor’s own home), Albert has a valid defense in law. On a
consequentialist rationale, however, Albert’s action was very
probably not the right thing to do as retreat would have produced a
net social benefit. If this is so, then Albert is not likely to be justified
on an objective (or deeds) theory.24 A justification will be hard to
support on a subjective (reasons) theory as well, for surely few
nonconsequentialist moral theories would conclude that Albert acted
rightly in choosing not to retreat. Indeed, it is at least arguable that he
did not even act morally permissibly, in which case he would not even
have a moral justification in the weak sense. It is very possible, in
short, that Albert’s perfect legal defense is not, morally speaking, a
justification.25
Of course, one can argue that Albert should not be granted a
defense. But then we’re engaged in substantive argument, not
conceptual analysis. If we agree that the mere existence of the
defense raises no logical or conceptual problem (regardless of
whether it’s good policy), it seems again that legal justifications are
not identical to moral justifications.
To recap, this brief argument against the substantive equivalence
thesis has proceeded as follows: (1) The criminal law might grant a
defense to someone who uses deadly force in self-defense even under
22. The rudiments of this hypothetical are presented in Kent Greenawalt, Justifications,
Excuses, and a Model Penal Code for Democratic Societies, 17 CRIM. JUST. ETHICS 14, 25
(1998).
23. The Model Penal Code, for instance, imposes no duty on actors to retreat from their
own homes, even when the assailant is a co-occupant. MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04(2)(b)(ii)(A)
(1962).
24. I assume here that objective theories of moral justification are likely to be
consequentialist and subjective theories nonconsequentialist. My argument, however, does not
depend upon this assumption.
25. Another piece of evidence suggesting that conduct can be legally justified but not
morally justified emerges from the facial difference between the “subjective” and “reasons”
theories of justification. See supra note 14. Actual criminal codes often draft justification
defenses to refer only to actors’ beliefs, not to their motivation. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE
§ 3.02(1) (requiring that the actor believe his conduct to be necessary to qualify for
justification). But a moral theory that evaluates conduct on the basis of something other than
objective facts is almost certain to care about the actor’s explanatory reasons, not only her
beliefs. Paul Robinson takes this fact as some evidence of the conceptual poverty or confusion
besetting current subjective approaches to justification, and thus as indirect support for a deeds
theory. ROBINSON, supra note 13, at 49–50. It might instead be taken to reinforce the revised
conception of criminal justifications introduced infra Part II.
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circumstances in which he could easily have retreated; (2) such a
defense, if granted, would be, legally speaking, a justification; but (3)
on most plausible moral theories, such conduct would not be morally
justified; therefore (4) not all legal justifications are moral
justifications. But perhaps this conclusion is too hasty. If it is, the
error seems most likely to lie with premise (2). That is, maybe if the
criminal law recognizes a defense under the circumstances specified,
that defense is not, as a matter of legal taxonomy, a justification.
Maybe it is something else. And if it is something else, then this
mundane example would not support the conclusion drawn.
Now, if our supposed defense is not, legally, a justification, what
else could it be? Recall that standard taxonomies of criminal law
defenses endorsed by proponents of the substantive equivalence
thesis contain three broad classes: justifications, excuses, and
26
“nonexculpatory” defenses of law enforcement policy. Under this
taxonomy, if Albert is not legally justified, then he is either legally
excused or the beneficiary of a nonexculpatory defense. Let’s
consider these possibilities in turn.
Unfortunately, the suggestion that Albert’s defense is, legally, an
excuse will not avail proponents of the substantive equivalence thesis.
If Albert is legally excused, then, according to substantive
equivalence, he must be morally excused too. But the assertion that
Albert is excused as a moral matter—hence that his criminal defense
is also, taxonomically, an excuse—is easily resisted. Why, after all,
should those who believe that Albert’s action was not morally
justified—even in the weak sense of being morally permissible—agree
that he is not morally blameworthy for the killing? It can’t be because
the criminal law permitted him to act as he did, for criminal law
permissions surely do not confer moral blamelessness. Lots of
blameworthy acts—lying, promise-breaking, many forms of gratuitous
cruelty to animals—are criminally permissible. It is very plausible,
therefore, to adjudge Albert blameworthy for sitting calmly in his
chair, waiting patiently to kill the slowly advancing Bushrod.
Furthermore, members of the community and legislators alike could
unanimously agree that Albert’s conduct was not morally justified in
either strong or weak senses and that he was morally blameworthy,
and nonetheless rationally continue to favor extending a defense in
circumstances like Albert’s. Decisionmakers could reasonably
believe, for example, that most people will retreat if they can, no
26.

See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
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matter what the law allows, and fear that ex post adjudications of
whether safe retreat would have been possible are too likely to
produce false positives (thus resulting in punishment of morally and
legally innocent persons) and to put excessive pressure on law27
abiding folk to attempt retreats that are in fact unsafe.
So, if premise (2) fails, it must be because Albert’s defense is a
28
non-exculpatory defense of law enforcement policy. This possibility
cannot be absolutely ruled out. But it comes at the cost of trivializing
the very taxonomy of criminal law defenses that theorists of the
justification/excuse distinction seem to think is so important.
Defenses respond to, and are shaped by, a variety of considerations—
such as whether the conduct is not morally wrongful; whether the
actor, albeit engaged in morally wrongful conduct, is not likely to be
morally blameworthy; and whether there exist reasons, apart from
considerations of moral wrongfulness and moral blameworthiness, for
not punishing the actor. This is clearly true. But so what? If this is all
we can say, the enterprise of trying to categorize defenses becomes
puzzling. A taxonomy should be more revealing than a bare list of
reasons. Yet if the standard tripartite taxonomy of criminal law
defenses is conceptually sound, and if Albert’s defense29 falls within
the nonexculpatory taxon as opposed to the justificatory taxon, the
illuminating power of the taxonomy seems lost. It adds no apparent
value to a mere laundry list of the diverse reasons for allowing any
particular conduct or circumstances to serve as a defense to a
criminal charge.

27. These points are made in Greenawalt, supra note 22, at 25.
28. Strictly speaking, this statement is too strong. If Albert’s defense is, legally speaking,
neither justification nor excuse, then it “must” be a nonexculpatory defense of law enforcement
policy only so long as those three categories exhaust the relevant taxa. But it is always open for
a proponent of substantive equivalence to avoid having to grant any proffered example of
legally justified conduct that is not morally justified by simply multiplying the proposed
categories of legal defenses. The response to such a move, though, would not be to demonstrate
that the example cannot fall within any of the newly proposed taxa. This is a futile way to attack
a moving target. The better response is to articulate and defend an alternative and more
satisfying way to conceive of legal justification which covers the example in question. That is the
task for Part II.
29. Notice that the fact that Albert could have safely retreated and chose not to is not a
necessary condition for satisfaction of the nominal legal defense that Albert will invoke—selfdefense. Had Albert been inclined to retreat but then (accurately) determined that safe retreat
would have been impossible, he would still be exculpated on grounds of self-defense. And in
that circumstance, he probably would be morally justified. So to treat Albert’s defense as
nonexculpatory is implicitly to maintain that self-defense is sometimes a legal justification and
sometimes a nonexculpatory defense, depending upon the facts of the individual case.
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Furthermore, Albert’s defense just doesn’t look very much like
the other defenses customarily placed in the third category—e.g.,
statute of limitations, diplomatic immunity, double jeopardy. These
latter defenses appear united by a family of systemic concerns of a
different character than the sorts of worries that might support
extending self-defense to protect Albert in his killing of Bushrod.
This is highly impressionistic, to be sure. But if there is truth to it,
then to clump all these varied sorts of defenses under one heading
threatens to turn this third category into a shapeless residual
category, drained of whatever coherence it might otherwise possess.
These two considerations, perhaps among others, may help explain
why no theorist of whom I am aware has proposed that any part of
self-defense be classified as something other than either justification
or excuse.
In sum, then, Albert has a valid criminal defense, even though,
very possibly, his conduct is neither morally justified (strongly or
weakly, objectively or subjectively), nor morally excusable. At the
risk of belaboring the point: Because the particular reasons why it
might be morally appropriate for the state to recognize a legal
justification are so heavily dependent upon such considerations as the
supposed inferior epistemic access enjoyed by post hoc factfinders
relative to the actor herself, they simply need not bear upon the
moral character of the actor’s conduct. And the supposition that this
defense is not a justification, but rather falls within the third category
of defenses involving “law enforcement policy,” threatens to divest
the proposed taxonomy of criminal law defenses of conceptual as well
as practical interest. The most likely possibility is simply that Albert’s
defense is, legally speaking, a justification, and therefore that
justification defenses need not be limited to morally justified conduct.
3. Summary. These brief examples demonstrate two things,
neither of which should surprise. First, conduct that is morally
justified on most theories of moral justification can lack any defense
under the criminal law. Second, a legal defense that seems most
intuitively classified as a justification can cover conduct that is not
morally justified on any plausible theory of moral justification. It
follows that, if there exists any sound and coherent distinction
between justification and excuse for purposes of the criminal law, it
cannot simply mimic the distinction conventionally supposed to exist
in ethics. The standard account is wrong.
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II. MORAL THEORY AND THE STRUCTURAL EQUIVALENCE THESIS
Happily, there is an obvious response. Morality and criminal law
are both normative systems. In each, it is true that a claim of
justification defeats the prima facie judgment that the actor has
violated a norm, and that a claim of excuse defeats the presumption
that the actor is normatively responsible for the violation of a norm.
Thus justification and excuse are generic concepts in normative
reasoning, serving the same logical function in law and in morals. But
if so, they necessarily have different meanings in the two systems to
the extent of the substantive differences between the two systems in
terms of, respectively, the content of the prohibitory norms, and the
principles of ascription.
Section A introduces what it means for justifications and excuses
to serve structurally or logically equivalent functions within the
normative systems of conventional morality and positive criminal law,
while differing in substantive content. Section B briefly elaborates
upon the structural equivalence thesis by situating this revised
account in the justification/excuse literature. In doing so, it sketches a
rough taxonomy of existing criminal law defenses. Section C
confronts one important question that the revised account raises—
namely, how we can determine whether a given defense is better
understood as qualifying a prima facie norm (hence is conceptually a
justification) or as foreclosing punishment for violation of a norm
(hence is conceptually an excuse).
A. The Revised Account Introduced
The conventional view in moral theory holds that a justification
serves to qualify a moral norm so as to provide moral permission for
conduct that would be presumptively wrongful.30 According to what I
will call “the structural equivalence thesis,” then, a justification within
the criminal law means that conduct which appears at first blush to be
criminal does not, all things considered, violate the law. In contrast,
an excuse means that it is criminal but not punishable. (See Figure 2.)
Under this view, justifications serve to qualify the norm for purposes
both of ex post evaluation and ex ante direction. They supplement the
prima facie norm so as to instruct the addressees regarding what
conduct the discourse allows. Excuses serve, only ex post, to relieve

30.

See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
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an actor of responsibility—in the one system, moral responsibility, in
31
the other, criminal responsibility—for having violated a norm.
Figure 2
The Revised Account
Meaning Within Normative System
Claim
Justification
Excuse

Normative
Significance
Defeats
norm violation
Defeats
responsibility

Morality

Criminal Law

Not wrongful

Not criminal

Wrongful, but not Criminal, but not
blameworthy
punishable

That the distinction between “not criminal” (i.e., justified) and
“criminal but not punishable” (i.e., excused) is not purely nominal is
32
well illustrated by the storied case of Dudley and Stephens. Charged
with murder for killing and eating the cabin boy while shipwrecked,
the defendants had claimed that their conduct was necessary to avoid
starvation.33 The court denied the defense. As Lord Coleridge
explained:
We are often compelled to set up standards we cannot reach
ourselves, and to lay down rules which we could not ourselves
satisfy. But a man has no right to declare temptation to be an
excuse, though he might himself have yielded to it, nor allow
compassion for the criminal to change or weaken in any manner the
34
legal definition of the crime.

Although the Dudley and Stephens court famously did not distinguish
35
between justification and excuse, once these terms are distinguished
31. See, e.g., MOORE, supra note 8, at 405 (remarking on the conceptual priority of
forward-looking norms of wrongdoing over the backward-looking judgments of culpability).
32. The Queen v. Dudley & Stephens, 14 Q.B.D. 273 (1884).
33. Id. at 273.
34. Id. at 288.
35. The court had posed the issue thus:
Now it is admitted that the deliberate killing of this unoffending and unresisting boy
was clearly murder, unless the killing can be justified by some well-recognised excuse
admitted by the law. It is further admitted that there was in this case no such excuse,
unless the killing was justified by what has been called “necessity.” . . .
It must not be supposed that in refusing to admit temptation to be an excuse for crime
it is forgotten how terrible the temptation was; how awful the suffering; how hard in
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and the issue of justification is explored, the question becomes
whether the criminal law should permit (or should be interpreted to
36
permit) killing under the circumstances of the case. Affirmative and
negative answers could each be supported. But even if we accept
arguendo the court’s judgment that Dudley and Stephens did violate
the criminal law, the question remains whether the court should
refrain from punishing them out of “compassion for the criminal” on
the grounds that they are not deserving of blame. To be sure, the
granting of an excuse (criminal but not punishable) would, as a
practical matter, “weaken” the criminal ban. But it would not, as a
logical or conceptual matter, “change . . . the legal definition.” It
would have been perfectly coherent for the court to have determined
that Dudley and Stephens did violate the law (i.e., were not legally
justified) but nonetheless should not be punished because they were
not blameworthy (i.e., were legally excused). This would not have
been identical, in either logic or social meaning, to a judgment that
the defendants did not violate the criminal law, even though the most
salient practical consequence—the defendants’ exculpation—would
have been the same in both cases.37
B. The Revised Account Situated
I expect this distinction is neither unclear nor controversial.
Indeed, I readily acknowledge that the revised conceptualization here
advanced—what I have termed the “structural equivalence” thesis—
is not a radical innovation. Remarks to similar effect can be found
such trials to keep the judgment straight and the conduct pure. . . . But a man has no
right to declare temptation to be an excuse, though he might himself have yielded to
it . . . . It is therefore our duty to declare that the prisoners’ act in this case was willful
murder, that the facts as stated in the verdict are no legal justification of the homicide.
Id. at 286–88 (emphases added).
36. Those circumstances could be defined, variously, as those in which there existed
objective necessity, or in which the actors actually believed there to be necessity, or in which they
actually and reasonably believed there to be necessity. For present purposes, the distinctions are
of no moment. Notwithstanding some efforts by the court to problematize the issue, it seems
fairly clear that all three conditions were satisfied.
37. J.C. Smith is therefore mistaken to charge that “[i]t is begging the question to declare
that [the Lordships] cannot ‘allow compassion for the criminal to change or weaken in any
manner the definition of crime,’ when the very issue before them is whether the person charged
is a criminal and whether the definition of crime extends to his case.” J.C. SMITH,
JUSTIFICATION AND EXCUSE IN THE CRIMINAL LAW 93 (1989). “The very issue” is, rather, two
separate issues that must be teased apart. A holding that the defendants were not justified
amounts to a conclusion that their conduct falls within the (complete) definition of the crime.
But such a judgment would not be inconsistent with a further judgment that compassion for
them warrants not labeling either “a criminal.”
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scattered throughout the literature. Perhaps most notably, H.L.A.
Hart explained that “[i]n the case of ‘justification’ what is done is
regarded as something which the law does not condemn, or even
welcomes,” whereas excuses lie when “the psychological state of the
agent . . . exemplified one or more of a variety of conditions which are
held to rule out the public condemnation and punishment of
38
individuals.” And as one respected American casebook puts it:
“Justification defenses state exceptions to the prohibitions laid down
by specific offenses. . . . They qualify and refine the proscriptions of
the penal law. . . . [D]octrines of excuse . . . recognize claims that
particular individuals cannot fairly be blamed for admittedly wrongful
conduct.”39 Several points need be made, though.
First, mere recitation of this view is no guarantee of
understanding. One California court, for instance, succinctly stated:
“Justification declares the allegedly criminal act legal; excuse admits
the act’s criminality but declares the allegedly criminal actor not to be
40
worthy of blame.” But it immediately proceeded to conclude:
“Therefore, justification requires an objective evaluation of the
allegedly criminal act; excuse requires only a subjective evaluation of
the allegedly criminal state of mind.”41 As I will explain in detail
below, this is a non sequitur.42 More generally, it is not uncommon for
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

HART, supra note 10, at 13–14 (footnotes omitted).
RICHARD J. BONNIE ET AL., CRIMINAL LAW 324 (1997).
People v. Aris, 264 Cal. Rptr. 167, 179 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989).
Id.
See infra Part III. For another illustration, see DOUGLAS N. HUSAK, PHILOSOPHY OF
CRIMINAL LAW 187–223 (1987). Husak begins with a clear and, to my mind, seemingly accurate
statement of justification: “A defendant who alleges a justification contends that his conduct
was not legally wrongful in his particular circumstances, even though it may (or may not) have
satisfied each of the elements of a criminal offense.” Id. at 189. Later, though, he concludes that
because “[j]ustifications . . . show conduct not to be wrongful . . . there is no reason why they
cannot be shared by confederates.” Id. at 205. Strictly speaking this is true. But nobody suggests
that justifications “cannot” be shared by confederates; the disputed question, I think, is only
whether it can be the case that justifications “are not” shared by confederates. It is this that I
take Husak to be denying. Put otherwise, Husak seems to be contending that because
“[j]ustifications . . . show conduct not to be wrongful,” they must be shared by confederates.
However, the simple claim that justifications must be shared by confederates is false. See Part
IV.A.
Perhaps Husak’s conclusion (as I have recharacterized it) would follow from his premise
were we to assume an objective theory of justification. That is, the “conduct” that a defendant
who alleges a justification defense contends was “not legally wrongful” may be limited, in
Husak’s view, to aspects of behavior not including the actor’s mental states. See, e.g., Douglas N.
Husak, Justifications and the Criminal Liability of Accessories, 80 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
491, 496 (1989) (“Justifications are defenses that arise from properties or characteristics of acts;
excuses are defenses that arise from properties or characteristics of actors.”). But, of course, this
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an author to define justification in both legal and moral terms, in
which event the whole significance of the shift from the standard to
43
the revised conception is lost.
Second, even those who appear to adopt what I have called the
revised view and might understand its implications (on which, more
shortly) generally appear not to recognize that it is far from the
44
prevailing understanding in the scholarly community. As a
is not how “conduct” must be understood. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.13(5) (1962)
(defining “conduct” to mean “an action or omission and its accompanying state of mind”).
Moreover, as Part III endeavors to show, it is not how justifications must be understood. Notice
this, then: What appears on first or even second glance to be a straightforward articulation of
what I have labeled the revised account of justification (“A defendant who alleges a justification
contends that his conduct was not legally wrongful in his particular circumstances . . .”) may,
instead, be intended to incorporate within it, as a definitional matter, contestable and contested
substantive claims.
43. Consider in this respect the influential work of Kent Greenawalt, whose writing on the
distinction between justification and excuse is especially subtle and insightful. In his much
praised 1984 article, Greenawalt observed that, “[i]f the law’s central distinction between
justification and excuse is to follow ordinary usage, it will be drawn in terms of warranted and
unwarranted behavior.” Greenawalt, supra note 12, at 1903. Although it’s not clear on its face
whether this refers to morally warranted and unwarranted behavior (per the substantive
equivalence thesis) or legally warranted and unwarranted behavior, the context strongly conveys
the former. This is certainly how Greenawalt is often understood. See, e.g., Garrett Epps, Any
Which Way But Loose: Interpretive Strategies and Attitudes Toward Violence in the Evolution of
the Anglo-American “Retreat Rule”, 55 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 303, 305 (Winter 1992)
(“Professor Greenawalt argues that a justified action is ‘warranted’ and ‘morally appropriate,’
while an excusable action is merely ‘not blameworthy’ because the person who commits it is not
‘fully responsible.’” (footnote omitted)); Hurd, supra note 12, at 1563–64 (reading Greenawalt
to endorse a subjective theory of moral justification). Fourteen years later, Greenawalt
reiterated his central claims in a shorter article, now writing that, for purposes of the criminal
law, “[a] claim of justification is a claim that one’s act was warranted, that what one did was
right, or was within a legally permissible range of behavior.” Greenawalt, supra note 22, at 16
(footnote omitted). Unfortunately, the notoriously ambiguous “or” makes this sentence
susceptible to a range of interpretations. Least plausibly, the passage could be suggesting a
three-part disjunction, such that a justification defense lies when one’s action is “warranted” or
morally right or legally permissible. Alternatively, it could mean that, for purposes of criminal
law, “warranted” is synonymous with legally right, which is synonymous with “within a legally
permissible range of behavior.” But surely the most natural reading holds that an action is
“warranted”—hence legally justified—if it is either “right” or “legally permissible,” in which
case right must mean something other than legally permissible—hence, presumably, morally
right. For Greenawalt to define legal justifications explicitly in terms of legal permissibility is, in
sum, a welcome advance. However, in my view, his definition will remain imprecise and
misleading so long as it includes reference (however veiled) to moral rightness. Better to follow
Donald Horowitz’s advice that we “begin the discussion of exculpation” by “ban[ning] words
like warranted.” Donald Horowitz, Justification and Excuse in the Program of Criminal Law, 49
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 109, 110 (Summer 1986).
44. One possible exception is B. Sharon Byrd, Wrongdoing and Attribution: Implications
Beyond the Justification-Excuse Distinction, 33 WAYNE L. REV. 1289 (1987), a largely astute
analysis that warrants more attention than it has apparently received.
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consequence, we find a great many commentators observing simply
that justifications mean that the conduct is “not wrongful”—with
most apparently intending “not morally wrongful,” a small minority
perhaps thinking “not criminally wrongful,” and the great majority, I
suspect, reading other unqualified references (without an eye for their
ambiguity) as conveying whatever meaning the author herself
45
favors. My objective, therefore, is to identify these two views, to
argue for the second, and to demonstrate why it matters.46
Third and relatedly, even those who correctly define criminal law
justifications as defeating criminality, as distinct from moral
wrongfulness, most often also define criminal law excuses as defeating
47
This
suggests
a
conception
of
the
blameworthiness.
justification/excuse distinction that operates as a middle ground
between the standard formulation we have rejected and the revised
view just put forward. (See Figure 3.) This is intuitively sensible. And
yet, if true, it might seem to throw into doubt my earlier claim that
justification and excuse are generic concepts of normative reasoning,
serving the same logical function in morality and criminal law. It is
easy enough to appreciate either substantive equivalence (per the
standard account) or structural equivalence (per the revised account).
But this third matrix has the air of compromise about it. And where
compromise can so easily reign, strong claims of conceptual logic
often stand on shaky footing. How can we be so sure that justification
defenses in the criminal law have no necessary relationship to notions
of moral wrongfulness if excuse defenses under the same system
mean nothing other than that the defendant is morally blameless?
Some thoughts about this issue might enable us to understand more
clearly the relationship between legal and moral categories.

45. Compare the ambiguity that the traditional M’Naghten rule of legal insanity produces
in providing that the defendant must be exculpated if he did not know the nature of his act or
did not know that it was wrong. Many courts and commentators have noted the question
whether this means morally wrong or legally wrong. See, e.g., 2 JAMES F. STEPHEN, HISTORY OF
THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 167 (1883). Surely, though, many others have simply failed
to notice a difficulty.
46. I do not mean to imply that there exist only two versions of the justification/excuse
distinction. Quite the contrary. Indeed, the leading English criminal law casebook offers this
third view: “An act is justified when we positively approve of it. It is merely excused when we
disapprove of it but think it is not right to treat it as a crime.” SMITH & HOGAN, CRIMINAL
LAW 189 (9th ed. 1999).
47. See, e.g., supra notes 39 and 40 and accompanying text.
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Figure 3
The Compromise Account
Meaning Within Normative System
Claim
Justification
Excuse

Normative
Significance
Defeats norm
violation
Defeats
responsibiliy

Morality

Criminal Law

Not wrongful

Not criminal

Wrongful but not Criminal but not
blameworthy
blameworthy

Let me start by proposing a rough, incomplete, and tentative
taxonomy of defenses under the criminal law, one that distinguishes
conduct that is “not prohibited” from prohibited conduct for which
the defendant is “not punishable,” and then subdivides the latter
category into defenses stemming from the defendant’s supposed “lack
of moral blameworthiness,” and those based on other reasons of “law
enforcement policy.” (See Figure 4.) Two aspects of the diagram are
48
immediately striking. First, in contrast to the prevailing three-part
schema of justification, excuse, and law enforcement (or
“nonexculpatory”) defenses,49 my taxonomy divides the relevant
universe into just two broad classes. Second, the concept of “excuse”
appears at two discrete levels in the hierarchy—corresponding to
moral excuse and legal excuse.50

48. A third feature that is worth remarking upon concerns the subject being taxonomized.
What is a “defense,” and how does one compare to a claim that serves to rebut elements of the
offense? Now, there may indeed be strong conceptual or normative bases upon which to sort
given elements into one category or the other. But the perspective reflected in the diagram is
purely positive: a defense, on this view, is a claim that arises after the commission of the offense
has been established, which is to say that it concedes (at least arguendo) a prima facie
violation—i.e., an “infringement”—of the criminal law. See infra note 117.
49. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
50. I should here acknowledge an alternative taxonomy, pursuant to which the first level of
the hierarchy—for purposes of ethics and the criminal law—would be divided into three
categories: justified (not prohibited), excused (not punishable), and not responsible (for reason
of lack of moral/legal agency). Put another way, agency defects could be reconceived as standing
on the first level of the hierarchy rather than the third. Both schemata are plausible. The critical
point advanced in text remains valid under either.

Law
enforcement
privilege

Defense
of others

Necessity
Selfdefense

Insanity

Entrapment
(subjective
version)

Duress

Morally excused

Provocation
(partial
excuse)

Involuntary
intoxication
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Defect of
moral agency

Lack of moral
blameworthiness

Entrapment
(objective
version)

Double
jeopardy

Diplomatic
immunity

Statute of
limitations

Law enforcement
policy

Defendant not
punishable
(= Legal excuse)
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The lesson to be drawn is just how complexly moral concepts play out
in the criminal law. Insofar as concepts used in moral discourse really
signify generic features of the structure or logic of normative
reasoning, those same concepts are likely to reappear in the criminal
law. In both systems, the concepts will share logical meaning but
differ in substantive content. (As already intimated, the term
“wrongful” supplies a prime example. Unmodified, it is generally
taken to mean “morally wrongful.” But the mere fact that it could be
thus qualified without redundancy indicates that it is really a generic
normative concept that exists across normative discourses—hence
“criminally wrongful.”51) However, the criminal law is not only a
normative system analogous to the system of ethics. It also, in diverse
and complicated manners, incorporates or operates upon the
substantive judgments made within the system of ethics. I will not try
to sort out the variety of ways this occurs. At the least, and very
generally, it is enough to understand that moral concepts serve both
as analogues to legal concepts (performing the same function within
the logic of the respective normative systems) and as the content or
substance of legal rules. The standard negative retributivist account of
the criminal law holds that individuals should be legally excused when
they are not morally blameworthy.52 This is a substantive position. It

51. I have argued elsewhere that the same could be said about the term “coercive.” See
Mitchell N. Berman, The Normative Functions of Coercion Claims, 8 LEGAL THEORY 45, 53–55
(2002). It bears emphasis that to recognize that concepts like “wrongful,” “right,” and
“coercive” serve analogous functions within the logics of criminal law and morality is not simply
to reiterate the commonplace that “law and morals share a vocabulary so that there are both
legal and moral obligations, duties, and rights.” H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 7 (2d ed.
1994); see also Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 459–60
(1897):
The law is full of phraseology drawn from morals, and by the mere force of language
continually invites us to pass from one domain to the other without perceiving it, as
we are sure to do unless we have the boundary constantly before our minds. The law
talks about rights, and duties, and malice, and intent, and negligence, and so forth,
and nothing is easier, or, I may say, more common in legal reasoning, than to take
these words in their moral sense, at some stage of the argument, and so to drop into
fallacy.
52. The term “negative retributivism” is introduced in J.L. Mackie, Morality and the
Retributive Emotions, 1 CRIM. JUST. ETHICS 3, 4 (1982). It is distinguished from what is often
considered retributivism simpliciter (but might with greater precision be divided into
“permissive retributivism” and “positive retributivism”) in not claiming that the moral
blameworthiness that attaches to antisocial conduct either provides a sufficient justification for
instituting a system of criminal punishment or provides an affirmative reason of any sort for
imposing punishment in a given case. Id. Perhaps better termed “side-constraint retributivism,”
it says only that an offender’s lack of blameworthiness renders it unjust to punish him (and may
also claim that it is unjust to punish an offender in excess of his desert).
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is not one that can be advanced by conceptual argumentation about
what it means to have a legal excuse.
Put otherwise, the compromise account of justification and
excuse (reflected in Figure 3) is accurate only because, and to the
extent that, the criminal law decides as a substantive matter to restrict
punishment to persons who are morally blameworthy for their
criminal acts, in the dual sense that they were the types of agents who
are proper bearers of moral ascriptions and that they were morally
53
culpable for acting as they did. That is, insofar as excuses bear the
same meaning under the criminal law as they do in moral theory, that
is for substantive, contingent reasons, not for conceptual ones. For
those—H.L.A. Hart most famously54—who deny that imposition of
criminal punishment must be limited to persons who are morally
blameworthy, it remains true that a criminal law excuse denotes nonpunishability, not non-blameworthiness. It follows that even negative
retributivists do better to recognize that criminal law excuses mean
only that the defendant should not be punished, although absence of
blameworthiness might well constitute a principal, perhaps sufficient,
reason why he should not be punished.
Similar remarks apply to justification. It is perfectly appropriate
to argue about such matters as whether an actor should be legally
justified whenever his conduct is morally justified (in a strong or weak
sense), and whether legal justification should be withheld from actors
whose conduct is not morally justified even in the weak sense of being
morally permissible. The important thing to understand is that such
positions are advanced, and resisted, by substantive moral argument
and by practical reasoning, not by conceptual analysis.55 So, even if we
53. This distinction between moral agency and culpability is succinctly put in MOORE,
supra note 8, at 403. For an apparently comparable distinction, see Stephen Shute et al.,
Introduction: The Logic of Criminal Law, in ACTION AND VALUE IN CRIMINAL LAW 1, 16
(Stephen Shute et al. eds., 1993) (distinguishing prima facie responsibility from all-thingsconsidered responsibility).
54. See HART, supra note 10, at 28–53 (arguing that voluntary action, but not moral
blameworthiness, should be a precondition for imposition of criminal punishment).
55. It is this point that Jeremy Horder’s proposed taxonomy, see Jeremy Horder, SelfDefence, Necessity, and Duress: Understanding the Relationship, 11 CANADIAN J.L. &
JURISPRUDENCE 143 (1998), by which the defenses of necessity, duress, and self-defense are
associated with, or identified by, a particular principle or “key issue”—respectively, the moral
imperative to act, the personal sacrifice demanded of the actor, and the legal permission to act,
id. at 143—threatens to obscure. If my account here is correct, then the legal permission to act is
what defines all defenses that fall under the more general conceptual rubric of justification.
Within the broad category of justifications, there are then different (yet potentially overlapping)
reasons of policy for recognizing particular defenses. Defenses of necessity are recognized, as
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find it more convenient to reserve the label of “excuse” for those
defenses that signal the defendant’s lack of moral responsibility (in
the twin senses of lack of moral agency and lack of moral
blameworthiness), that does not throw into doubt my claim that
criminal law justifications signal only absence of criminality, not
absence of moral wrongfulness, which is the point I most want to
56
insist upon.

Horder says, because of the “overriding reasons” that support acting in cases of necessity. Id. at
155. Defenses involving use of force against attackers might then be recognized for a host of
reasons, including the presence of overriding reasons, and because refusing to do so could
threaten to undermine popular support for the law. As we have seen, actions that are driven by
moral imperative might nonetheless fall outside the scope of any legal defense. In these cases,
the absence of legal permission entails the absence of a necessity defense notwithstanding the
actual (or arguable) moral imperative.
56. Another way to appreciate this claim is to examine George Fletcher’s reasons for
concluding otherwise. Fletcher starts by arguing that legal norms should approximate moral
norms. See, e.g., GEORGE P. FLETCHER, BASIC CONCEPTS OF CRIMINAL LAW 93–110 (1998).
However, if this is not a conceptual claim about the criminal law, but rather a normative
argument to be pressed to legislators, then no matter how closely justifications under the
criminal law should conform to moral justifications, all that can be said as a conceptual matter is
this: “If the legislature has authority to define the ‘elements of the offense’, then it should have
the same authority over the negative elements we call claims of justification.” George P.
Fletcher, The Nature of Justification, in ACTION AND VALUE IN CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 53,
at 176. To understand why Fletcher resists this conclusion, one need recognize the depth of his
commitment to a particular jurisprudential position about the proper structure of legal
reasoning. He explains:
Flat legal discourse proceeds in a single stage, marked by the application of a legal
norm that invokes all of the criteria relevant to the resolution of a dispute. Structured
legal discourse proceeds in two stages: first, an absolute norm is asserted; and second,
qualifications enter to restrict the scope of the supposedly dispositive norm.
Fletcher, The Right and the Reasonable, supra note 3, at 951. See generally George P. Fletcher,
Two Modes of Legal Thought, 90 YALE L.J. 970 (1981). Structured legal reasoning, Fletcher
argues, is superior to flat. Flat reasoning, which would view a justification defense as merely
negating the offense is, Fletcher says, to treat killing a human in self-defense like killing a fly.
See, e.g., FLETCHER, BASIC CONCEPTS OF CRIMINAL LAW, supra, at 80; Fletcher, The Nature of
Justification, supra, at 183; Fletcher, The Right and the Reasonable, supra note 3, at 977. That, of
course, is not faithful to meaningful aspects of our experience. A “positivist” conception of
justification that divorces justification defenses from any necessary relation to moral
wrongfulness “holds that there is no conceptual structure in the criminal law at all.” Fletcher,
The Nature of Justification, supra, at 176. And because there is a conceptual structure, he
concludes, the positivist account must be wrong. See id. at 176–77 (criticizing “positivists” for
being unable to “concede the existence of distinctions immanent in the law”).
The problem, I think, is that Fletcher is conflating two separate points. The first is that the logic
of the criminal law should distinguish between (prima facie) “infringements” and (all-thingsconsidered) “violations,” the second being that infringements are prevented from becoming
violations by the presence of a moral justification. See Judith Jarvis Thomson, Some
Ruminations on Rights, 19 ARIZ. L. REV. 45, 47 (1977). Yet there is no necessary connection
between them. That there may be “a structural distinction between elements of the offence and
claims of justification” which “acquire[s] [its] appeal . . . from [its] intrinsic plausibility,”
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C. Identifying Permissions
I have argued to this point that a justification defense within the
criminal law has no necessary connection to the substantive claims of
morality but, instead, constitutes an exception to the criminal law
offenses in the sense of permitting conduct that an offense by its
terms prohibits. To some extent, though, this argument has merely
shifted the inquiry. If a given defense of positive law is a justification
if and only if it confers all-things-considered legal permission, and an
excuse if and only if it establishes that an actor is not punishable
notwithstanding that her behavior was not legally permitted, then a
successful classification depends upon our ability to determine when a
defense does in fact qualify a prohibition so as to confer legal
permission. That is to say, for example: Is the defendant who is
exculpated on grounds of self-defense exculpated because her
conduct was legally permissible (hence justified) or because she is not
punishable (hence excused) for engaging in conduct that was legally
impermissible? Precisely how such a determination should proceed is
not quite so obvious as one might suppose.
1. Of Form and Substance. The central question is this: Are the
contours of a legal norm determined formally or substantively? If
formally, then a permission is whatever the penal code says it is. Thus,
if a defense is drafted to provide that “it is not an offense if . . . .” or
“however, an actor shall be permitted to . . . .” or something similar,
then that defense qualifies the norm, hence is a justification. In
contrast, a defense which specifies “however, an actor shall not be
punished if . . . .” confers an excuse.

Fletcher, The Nature of Justification, supra, at 176, does not entail—what is the present
question—that elements and justifications in the criminal law must have some particular
substantive content. One can acknowledge that there exists a conceptual structure, or logic,
underlying the law by which a prima facie norm (the offense) is qualified by justification
defenses which establish that, all-things-considered, the norm is not violated, and still deny both
that “[a] statutory definition should be understood as an approximation, by rule, of a principled
understanding of wrongful conduct,” id. at 177, and that moral justification need defeat the
prima facie offense. The first claim is incorrect because the conceptual structure of the criminal
law allows for mala prohibita, and the second is incorrect because, given the inescapable overand underinclusiveness of articulated rules (among other reasons), a legislature could
reasonably decide to restrict the scope of moral justifications that serve as legal justifications.
Simply put, the revised conception of justification defenses need not deny the conceptual
distinction between infringement and violation, but only that the content of legal infringement
and violation need track the content of moral infringement and violation.
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The obvious problem confronting the formal solution is that few
defenses are written in a fashion that resolves the problem. Most say
simply that “it shall be a defense that . . . .” Such language provides
no help at all. Many modern codes, it is true, explicitly classify their
defenses under the headings of justification or excuse, or incorporate
this terminology into the formulation of individual defenses: “an actor
shall be justified [or excused] if . . . .” But this too cannot always be
dispositive of the question whether the defense is indeed a
justification or excuse, lest the conceptual inquiry be displaced by a
wholly empirical one. For these reasons, a purely formal solution to
the classificatory question seems unpromising.
The alternative, then, must be that there exists some sort of
substantive metric that determines the contours of the prohibitory
norms that comprise the criminal law. That is not to contradict the
observation in Part I that the criminal law need not, and does not,
incorporate the substantive judgments supplied by the realm of
morals. Instead, we look to a substantive metric that derives from the
criminal law’s challenge of regulating conduct by means of
punishment against a background of fallible institutions. Only by
understanding the judgments of right, wrong, and permissible that
particular jurisdictions make—assuming that the criminal law in a
given jurisdiction satisfies some minimal standards of internal
coherence or integrity—can we determine whether or not a defense is
intended to function as a permission even if the language of the
defense provides no guidance. This is an approach, then, that owes
more to sociology and empirical political science than to moral or
legal theory. To take our earlier example, anyone with a passing
understanding of our legal culture is likely to interpret the substantive
criminal law as intended to permit persons to use (nondeadly) force
as necessary to ward off a mugger or rapist. If so, then at least these
core instances of self-defense are, in our criminal law, justifications.
But are these judgments merely interstitial or defeasible,
enabling judgments only unless or until a defense is written in terms
that specifically grant permission or except conduct from the reach of
the criminal law? Suppose a provision of the penal code says: “For
purposes of the criminal law, it is permissible for a child under the age
of seven to engage in an act that would be a criminal offense were the
57
child over the age of 18.” Does the fact that the defense assumes the
57. I am indebted to Peter Westen both for this example and for challenging me on
this issue.
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form of a permission necessarily determine that it’s a justification
rather than an excuse?
I think not. We can test our intuitions by imagining that we
carefully explained the distinction between (a) an exception from a
prohibitory norm and (b) a constraint on application of punishment
(including the censure that a judgment of norm-violation brings) to
the drafters. Would they have reason to consider it (a) rather than
(b)? Surely they could. They could, for example, believe it
advantageous for the full flowering of human individuality that young
children experiment with conduct that the law prohibits of them later
in life. If so, then the defense really is a permission, hence a
justification rather than an excuse. But absent this or a similarly
unlikely story, we would probably conclude that the substantive
principles of this particular normative regime do disallow this
conduct. Notwithstanding its somewhat unfortunate language, we
would suppose, the nominal permission really grants an excuse—an
excuse grounded, most likely, on the judgment that young children
are (at best) only imperfect moral agents.
More generally, this sociologically informed alternative differs
from a purely formalistic effort to tell us just what are the
justifications and what are the excuses in the criminal law of any given
jurisdiction precisely in its being subject to the demand of reasongiving in this way. Moving from formalism to what is a form of
sociological jurisprudence has the consequence that whether a
particular defense is a justification, or, instead, is an excuse no longer
depends solely upon the vagaries of statutory drafting. Instead, where
a particular defense fits within this conceptual structure becomes
something that can be interrogated. Further, this feature does impose
constraints, because the creators and conservators of the legal system
being investigated must be able to give reasons in support of one or
another understanding of the functional role that a given defense
plays. This critically distinguishes the formalist approach, which takes
the language of the statutory scheme at face value and imposes no
demand of intelligible reason-giving. Because of this distinction,
sociological jurisprudence leaves the content of particular penal codes
58
open-ended, but, unlike formalism, not completely so.

58. In emphasizing the difference between a substantive, sociologically informed
understanding of the criminal law’s norms and a merely formal one, I should not be understood
to be collapsing the difference between structural and substantive equivalence. To undertake an
empirical inquiry into the content of the substantive norms of a given criminal law regime is
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2. Conduct Rules, Decision Rules, and Acoustic Separation. I
have just argued that permissions are determined substantively, not
formally, even though the substantive metric is one generated within
the criminal law rather than supplied extrinsically by the realm of
morals. Additionally, I have maintained that the actual language that
a given penal code employs may be probative, but not conclusive,
evidence of the substantive norms that the legal regime aims to
promulgate. Even if I am right, we may want a more concise principle,
shortcut, or test for identifying what is substantively a permission (or,
put another way, what are the true contours of the substantive norm)
than I have yet supplied. Can we find one?
Perhaps. After all, the basic distinction that the structural
equivalence thesis draws between judgments of “not criminal” and
“criminal but not punishable,” would seem to map onto the familiar
Benthamite distinction between rules addressed to the public
commanding or prohibiting some behavior and rules directing judges
what to do if the first sort of rule is violated. “Let no man steal,”
offered Bentham by way of illustration; “and, Let the judge cause
59
whoever is convicted of stealing to be hanged.” In recent years, the
distinction has been recovered and refined by Meir Dan-Cohen, who
terms the first sort of rule a conduct rule and the second sort a
decision rule.60
The relevance of Dan-Cohen’s conduct rule/decision rule
distinction for the justification/excuse debate might seem obvious.
Because justification defenses grant permissions, it would appear to
follow that they are supposed to be understood by the public at large
and, therefore, are within the conduct rules. In its core applications,
for example, self-defense would seem both justificatory and a
quintessential conduct rule: “You may cause the death of another

much like asking what are a particular community’s substantive norms of etiquette, subject to a
couple of qualifications. First, the substantive norms of a criminal law regime are likely to be
more deeply influenced by the society’s moral judgments (without being reducible to them)
than are the norms of etiquette. Second, an Anglo-American criminal theorist asking this sort of
question about Anglo-American criminal law generally, or about a particular Anglo-American
jurisdiction, is perhaps more likely to find her answer to the empirical question influenced by
her own substantive moral views.
59. JEREMY BENTHAM, A FRAGMENT ON GOVERNMENT AND AN INTRODUCTION TO THE
PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION 430 (Wilfred Harrison ed., 1948) (1789).
60. Meir Dan-Cohen, Decision Rules and Conduct Rules: On Acoustic Separation in
Criminal Law, 97 HARV. L. REV. 625, 626–30 (1984) (demonstrating, against Bentham, Kelsen,
and others, that the two sorts of rules cannot be collapsed into one another, i.e., that neither is a
mere implication of the other).
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human being if doing so is necessary to protect yourself from his
imminent and unprovoked use of deadly force against you.” Excuses
don’t grant permissions. They tell judges when persons who have
acted without permission ought not to be punished. “Don’t punish
someone who is insane” would therefore seem like an excuse and a
decision rule. In short, one might suppose that justifications simply
are those defenses that fall within the system’s conduct rules, while
excuses are the defenses residing in the decision rules.
I think this is precisely right. Indeed, the conceptual distinction
between justification as a conduct rule and excuse as a decision rule—
the first declaring that some conduct presumptively criminal is legally
permissible, the second instructing judges not to punish offenders
despite their conduct having been impermissible—is so intuitively
sensible that the greater question is not whether it’s sound, but why it
61
has not already been widely embraced. While a full answer is
impossible here, the puzzle is sufficiently robust as to warrant
something more than rhetorical treatment.
A first step toward an answer may begin by looking closely at
Dan-Cohen’s notion of “acoustic separation.” Imagine, he proposes,
that the addressees of a system’s conduct rules had no knowledge of
62
the existence or application of its decision rules. Under a
hypothetical regime of “acoustic separation” between the two sets of
63
rules, individuals truly are guided only by the conduct rules, even if
they might benefit from decision rules ex post for reasons
(paradigmatically, but not exclusively) of fairness to the individual. In
this regime, unlike in the real world, the awaiting decision rules could
not influence the behavior of persons subjected only to the conduct
61. One explanation can be quickly dispensed with. It might be objected that, even if this
distinction is conceptually sound, the fact that acoustic separation is actually a fiction means that
distinguishing justification defenses from excuse defenses cannot have practical significance. But
this is no objection at all. Perhaps the distinction is not useful—a matter about which the present
argument can remain agnostic. I claim only that there exists a conceptual distinction between
the two, one that scholars have spilled a great deal of ink trying to articulate with precision. For
skepticism regarding its practical utility, see Eric Colvin, Exculpatory Defenses in Criminal Law,
10 OXFORD J. LEG. STUD. 381, 383–91 (1990), and Greenawalt, supra note 12. Cf. Dan-Cohen,
supra note 60, at 636–37 (purporting only to show “the logical independence of decision rules
and conduct rules and the potential utility of this independence”).
62. Dan-Cohen, supra note 60, at 630–34.
63. Although conduct rules are sometimes described as “guiding” public conduct, this is
potentially misleading for reasons John Gardner has pointed out. Very simply, “the law does
not provide any reasons for one to do what the law holds to be justified.” Gardner, supra note
14, at 124. At least for purposes of the criminal law, therefore, conduct rules should be
understood merely as specifying the circumstances under which conduct is, or is not, criminal.
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64
rules. Not surprisingly, Dan-Cohen offers the defense of duress as
exhibit A of a decision rule:

[I]n the imaginary world of acoustic separation . . . . it becomes
obvious that the policies advanced by the defense would lead to its
use as a decision rule—an instruction to the judge that defendants
who under duress committed acts that would otherwise amount to
offenses should not be punished. Just as obviously, no comparable
rule would be included among the conduct rules of the system:
knowledge of the existence of the defense of duress would not be
permitted to shape individual conduct; conduct would be guided
65
exclusively by the relevant criminal proscriptions.

Just so. It is the smallest of steps to generalize from this
discussion of duress to the broader claim I suggested earlier—namely,
that the distinction between justification defenses (exemplified by
necessity) and excuse defenses (exemplified by duress) just is the
distinction between those defenses that reside among the conduct
rules and those that are part of the decision rules.
Importantly, though, Dan-Cohen himself does not draw this
conclusion. Instead, when addressing the supposition that “the
necessity norm would be included not only among the imaginary legal
system’s decision rules, but also among its conduct rules,” he
66
concludes that “this would not necessarily be so.” “[W]hen the
source of the necessity is the actor’s self-interest,” he explains, “[t]he
prospect of a defense to a future criminal charge is likely to enhance
the tendency to exaggerate the sense of necessity of protecting one’s
own interests.”67 So it may be more prudent not to let persons facing
exigencies know that a necessity defense will be available. “At least in
some cases, the test of necessity should be the actor’s willingness to
face, as an alternative to the ill consequences of abiding by the law,
the threat of criminal punishment unmitigated by the prospect of

64. I emphasize, especially for the benefit of British lawyers, that “duress” for Dan-Cohen
apparently refers to action undertaken in the face of threats, but not amounting to the choice of
a lesser evil. So, for instance, if B robs a store in response to A’s threat to kill him, B’s defense is
necessity, not duress. (Technically, under the Model Penal Code, B would have both defenses.
See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.09(4) (1962) (specifying that a duress defense is not precluded
solely because the conduct would also be justifiable). Still, to understand Dan-Cohen’s point,
one should focus on that subcategory of duress that does not also constitute necessity.) See also
supra note 9.
65. Dan-Cohen, supra note 60, at 633; see also id. at 632–34.
66. Id. at 638.
67. Id.
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68
legal reprieve.” Some types of necessity defenses, therefore, should
be known only to the ex post decisionmakers; they are better thought
of as decision rules.
Dan-Cohen is right in this sense: necessity (or some subset
thereof) might well be a decision rule in a hypothetical world of
acoustic separation. But that is not quite the same as establishing that
necessity is a decision rule in our real world of acoustic integration.
Imagine a prisoner who escapes to avoid being raped and murdered
by his cellmate. After securing a lawyer, he surrenders to authorities,
is charged with the felony of escaping from prison, and pleads
necessity in defense. If the jurisdiction recognizes the defense of
necessity when a defendant chose the lesser evil, and if it does not
disallow the defense in escape cases, the prisoner should probably be
exculpated. And according to Dan-Cohen, the defense falls within the
decision rules. We don’t want to punish this particular escapee
because he did what the norms embodied in, and realized by, this
criminal law regime consider the right thing to have done. At the
same time, though, we don’t want other prisoners to know about his
exculpation because those in truly dire straits will try to escape no
matter what they believe the conduct rules provide, and because
publicizing the defense would risk encouraging prisoners to escape
even absent true necessity.
Of course, this analysis establishes at the same time that the
defense is a justification in the sense advocated by the structural
equivalence thesis: the substantive norms of the system do in fact
permit this particular prisoner to act as he did even if he didn’t know
it. To put it another way, the prisoner who escapes under conditions
of true necessity simply does not violate any substantive norm of the
criminal law regime. It would not be appropriate to criticize him. One
can permit something, after all, even without announcing that one
permits it. Perhaps, we may even say, “permitting” is not the same as
“giving permission.” Thus, under Dan-Cohen’s hypothetical regime
of acoustic separation, authorities who announced in the conduct
rules that necessity is no defense to prison escape, but who then
placed precisely such a defense within the decision rules, would be
doing something different than concealing merely an exemption from
punishment for the violation of a norm. They would be strategically
concealing a true permission. That is, the defense that they have

68.

Id.
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hidden within the decision rules would remain, conceptually,
a justification.
In short, although Dan-Cohen rejects the implication of the
revised view that the justification/excuse distinction maps cleanly
onto the distinction between conduct rules and decision rules, that is
only because conduct rules and decision rules become subtly
transformed by the acoustic separation gloss. Acoustic separation is
designed to help distinguish conduct rules from decision rules. Yet
the thought experiment it invites is not a sure guide. We don’t really
live in a world of acoustic separation. Dan-Cohen asks us to imagine
that the conceptual distinction between conduct and decision rules
are manifested in positive law. However because strategic
considerations would then be afoot, some things that “really” are
conduct rules—”really” in the sense of reflecting the actual
substantive norms that the particular criminal law system takes itself
to be embodying—would be placed within the decision rules—and
69
perhaps vice versa. Put another way, the acoustic separation device
partly bolsters our intuitive sense of what are conduct rules and what
are decision rules, but partly distorts it as well. Justifications are those
defenses that exist, conceptually, within the conduct rules, while
excuses are those defenses that exist, conceptually, within the
decision rules. It does not follow that this mapping would survive a
transition to the hypothetical world of acoustic separation. The
influence of Dan-Cohen’s two-decades-old device might therefore
help explain why the straightforward conceptualization of
justifications as the conduct rule defenses and excuses as the decision

69. Recall Peter Westen’s hypothetical of a law that declares it permissible for a child
under seven to engage in conduct that is made criminal for adults. See supra note 57 and
accompanying text. I suggested that, even though we could imagine circumstances under which
this defense qualifies the substantive norms, hence is a justification, this is probably best
conceptualized as an excuse notwithstanding the somewhat infelicitous statutory language. If we
choose to conceptualize the criminal laws as divided into conduct rules and decision rules, this
would be a decision rule. And it would probably remain a decision rule even in a world of
acoustic separation: precocious six-year-olds who read the penal code would learn that they
must not kill, steal, or vandalize; only the judges would know not to punish the very young
transgressor.
Imagine, though, that these same six-year-olds read news reports of other children who
commit crimes and are prosecuted. As a consequence, they experience withering anxiety that
they too will be prosecuted—not because they anticipate committing crimes, but only because
they fear being apprehended on cases of mistaken identity. If confronted by a nation of
depressed kindergartners, the authorities could be moved to alleviate the children’s fears by
publishing the infancy defense among the regime’s conduct rules. I submit that the defense
would nonetheless remain both an excuse and, conceptually speaking, a decision rule.
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rule defenses is so rarely appreciated today. Indeed, even George
70
Fletcher, the dean of justification and excuse scholars, has explicitly
71
identified justification as a decision rule, not a conduct rule.
3. Summary. The structural equivalence thesis holds that a
justification in the criminal law is simply an exception to, or
permission grafted upon, a criminal offense; an excuse defense
obtains when a defendant is exempted from punishment for
committing a criminal offense. This is not to say that whether a given
defense is a justification or an excuse depends solely on how the
governing statute happens to classify the defense, or whether a
defense is drafted with magic words like “permitted to . . . .” or “shall
not be punished if . . . .” To the contrary, whether a given defense is a
justification depends upon substantive judgments about the precise

70. By my count, Fletcher has addressed the subject on at least eighteen occasions. E.g.,
BASIC CONCEPTS OF CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 56, at 74–170; BASIC CONCEPTS OF LEGAL
THOUGHT 104–08 (1996); A CRIME OF SELF-DEFENSE: BERNHARD GOETZ AND THE LAW ON
TRIAL (1988); RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 3, at 759–875; Dogmas of the Model
Penal Code, 2 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 3, 12–24 (1998); Domination in the Theory of Justification
and Excuse, 57 U. PITT. L. REV. 553 (1996); Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory, 85 HARV. L.
REV. 537, 556–64 (1972); The Individualization of Excusing Conditions, 47 S. CAL. L. REV. 1269
(1974); Mistake in the Model Penal Code: A False False Problem, 19 RUTG. L.J. 649, 656–70
(1988); The Nature and Function of Criminal Theory, 88 CAL. L. REV. 687, 697, 701–02 (2000);
The Nature of Justification, supra note 56, at 175; Proportionality and the Psychotic Aggressor: A
Vignette in Comparative Criminal Theory, 8 ISR. L. REV. 367 (1973); The Right and the
Reasonable, supra note 3; The Right Deed for the Wrong Reason, supra note 1; The Right to Life,
13 GA. L. REV. 1371, 1376–94 (1979); Rights and Excuses, CRIM. JUST. ETHICS, Summer-Fall
1984, at 17; Should Intolerable Prison Conditions Generate a Justification or an Excuse for
Escape?, 26 UCLA L. REV. 1355 (1979); The Unmet Challenge of Criminal Theory, 33 WAYNE
L. REV. 1439 (1987).
71. Fletcher, The Nature of Justification, supra note 56, at 180. Strikingly, he had asserted
nearly a decade earlier that “the criteria of justification are supposed to function not only ex
post as decision rules, but ex ante as conduct rules.” Fletcher, The Right and the Reasonable,
supra note 3, at 976. It is perhaps not surprising, then, that he should concede that his more
recent characterization of justification as a decision rule “is by no means obvious.” Fletcher, The
Nature of Justification, supra note 56, at 180 n.8. Unfortunately, the explanation he gives for the
uncertainty is confusing. “Claims of justification do enter into debates between individuals
about whether their conduct is right or wrong,” Fletcher acknowledges. Id. “The question is
whether it is the legislative language as such, or rather the general principles of justification, that
enter into these debates.” Id. But what makes this “the question” is unclear. If he means that
legislative language is not dispositive of whether a defense is a justification, I agree. But this
point is not sufficient to drive justifications out of the realm of conduct rules. See also Shute et
al., supra note 53, at 12–13 (intimating that justifications are better viewed as conduct rules);
Colvin, supra note 61, at 385 (“A defence of justification modifies the rules of conduct to which
it applies . . . . A defence of excuse, on the other hand, supposedly leaves the prohibitory
rule intact.”).
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contours of the norms that the criminal regime can best be
understood to promulgate.
Another way to capture this point is that a justification exists
within the conduct rules, while an excuse exists within the decision
rules. Unfortunately, this way of putting things provides little
guidance in determining whether any given defense is a justification
or an excuse. For one thing, no real Anglo-American penal codes are
explicitly divided into conduct rules and decision rules. Furthermore,
even if they were, we would still be confronted by the problem that
the precise form of a penal code is an unreliable indication of its true
substantive normativity. Persons who are frustrated by the rejection
of the formalist solution to the problem of distinguishing justifications
from excuses might be drawn to Dan-Cohen’s acoustic-separation
thought experiment, seeing in it a somewhat more mechanical way
than otherwise seems to exist for determining which defenses fall
within the regime’s conduct rules, hence are justifications, and which
fall within the decision rules, hence are excuses. Acoustic separation
is in many ways an illuminating device. But it can be misleading: some
defenses that a crafty legislature might place within the decision rules
under such a hypothetical regime might nonetheless really be
justifications, and some defenses placed within the conduct rules
might really be excuses.
III. THE SUBJECTIVE/OBJECTIVE DEBATE
I have argued that the roles that justifications and excuses play in
the criminal law are structurally equivalent, but not substantively
equivalent, to the roles they play in moral reasoning. But I have also
argued that the metric for determining whether a given criminal law
defense is one of justification or of excuse is substantive, not formal.
That is, the precise language of the penal code is only evidence of
how a given defense is best classified. It is possible that a defense
denominated as a permission could be more sensibly understood as
an excuse, and vice versa. Lastly, I argued that Dan-Cohen’s thought
experiment—how the statutes would be crafted in a hypothetical
regime of acoustic separation—is not a sure guide for distinguishing
justifications from excuses. If all this is correct, we are left with the
view that identifying the precise contours of a given criminal law
norm—that is, determining whether a given defense qualifies the
norm or excepts the offender from punishment for violating the
norm—is a contestable matter of sociological jurisprudence.
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A major challenge to this view is presented in the literature
addressing whether justifications are “subjective” or “objective.”
Partisans to this debate argue that at least some general
jurisprudential things can be said about justifications and excuses—
claims that are true by virtue of the nature of justifications and
excuses as concepts relevant to the criminal law and do not depend
upon the substantive normativity of a particular criminal law regime.
Roughly, the subjectivists argue that an actor who believes that
circumstances exist which would confer a justification is legally
justified (at least if the belief is reasonable, and perhaps even if not),
whereas one who acts in ignorance of potentially justificatory
circumstances that do exist is fully inculpated. Objectivists, in
contrast, contend that the actor who mistakenly believes his conduct
justified is, at most, excused, and that one who commits an offense
unaware of circumstances sufficient to confer a justification is at least
partially exculpated. As a trans-jurisdictional matter, that is,
justifications just are objective or just are subjective.
I believe that both of these views are mistaken. This Part argues
that conceiving of a criminal justification defense as meaning only
that the conduct was not criminal, and an excuse defense as meaning
that the conduct was criminal but the actor is not punishable, entails
no necessary position on the question of whether justifications should
be objective or subjective. Section A develops this claim in the
context of “mistaken justifications.” Section B addresses the converse
situation, “unknowing justifications.”
A. Mistaken Justification
Suppose that Agnes employs force against Barnaby, erroneously
but reasonably believing that such use of force is necessary to protect
herself, or some third party Clive, from Barnaby’s imminent exercise
of unlawful force. Apparently all commentators agree that Agnes
should be exculpated if subsequently prosecuted for assault or
homicide. (This, of course, is a moral claim about the shape that a just
criminal law ought to take.) On a subjective (or “reasons”) theory,
72
Agnes has a justification, but not on an objective (“deeds”) theory.
Because her use of force was not “objectively” the right thing to have

72. See supra note 14 and accompanying text (discussing the relationship between
subjective and reasons theories on the one hand, and between objective and deeds theories on
the other).
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done, the deeds theory of justification leaves Agnes only with
an excuse.
Now, it is apparent that criminal defenses could be drafted so as
nominally to comply with either the subjective or the objective vision.
That is, the criminal law could provide on its face that persons are
permitted to use force in self-defense or defense of others either (a)
when they believe that it’s necessary, or (b) when, from a God’s-eye
73
perspective, it actually is necessary. Of course, given my earlier
rejection of the purely formalist approach to divining what is or is not
a true exception to a criminal prohibition,74 the fact that a permission
could be couched in either subjective or objective terms is not
conclusive with respect to the question of whether the form is faithful
to the reality. Still, the possibility that the nominal norm does indeed
reflect the substantive norm should not be dismissed out of hand. If
we can imagine a legislature drafting a permission in either subjective
or objective terms, we can also imagine the legislators defending that
choice on substantive grounds. Accordingly, the argumentative
burden fairly falls on one who would insist that, whatever form a
given statutory regime might take, a justification, rightly understood,
just is subjective or just is objective. This Section argues that the
burden has not been met.
1. Arguments from Logic. One approach in the literature has
been to argue that we are compelled to conceptualize justifications
either as objective or as subjective to avoid the unacceptable
consequences of either a reductio ad absurdum or a logical
contradiction.
a. The objectivist reductio ad absurdum. The reductio favored
by objectivists is simple to state. In fairly unusual (though by no
means extraordinary) circumstances, they have sometimes argued the
reasons theory fails to allow any defense (whether of justification or
excuse) for persons who, according to our intuitions, should be

73. These are not the only choices. Conceivably, a justification defense could lie when
either condition is satisfied, or only if both are. Furthermore, the law could distinguish between
actual unreasonable beliefs and actual reasonable beliefs. For instance, the law could be drafted
along these lines: You may use force in self-defense to the extent you believe necessary . . . but
only if you have taken all reasonable steps under the circumstances to ascertain the need. Or, a
reasons approach could mitigate punishment for actors who make unreasonable mistakes about
the need to use force.
74. See supra Part II.C.1.

BERMAN.DOC

2003]

01/30/04 9:04 AM

JUSTIFICATION AND EXCUSE

41

75
exculpated. In the hypothetical above, recall, Agnes’s belief in the
need to use force against Barnaby is mistaken. Perhaps, say, Barnaby
is actually an actor in a play, or the knife he appears to be wielding is
actually a corn dog. Unfortunately, let us suppose, Barnaby can avoid
injury or death at Agnes’s hands only by using preemptive force
against her. If he does so, does he have a defense? Presumably most
people think so (at least where Barnaby was not negligent in inducing
Agnes’s false belief in the first place). And it’s easy enough to reach
that conclusion under the objective theory of justification: Barnaby is
objectively justified in defending himself against Agnes’s unlawful
(albeit excused) use of force. But, the argument continues, he is not
justified on a subjective theory. Therefore, unless we are to deny
Barnaby any defense at all, we are logically compelled to define
justification objectively.
To address this argument, we must first understand precisely why
Barnaby is supposed to lack a valid defense if, as the subjectivists
would have it, Agnes herself has a defense of justification. The
argument starts by identifying the candidate defenses—self-defense,
duress, and necessity—and proceeds by process of elimination. Selfdefense and duress are unavailable, it is said, because (among other
things)76 they apply only in response to “unlawful force,”77 and force is
lawful if justified. Necessity is said to be unavailable on the grounds
that it is logically impossible for two actors each to be “justified” in
assaulting the other,78 and, furthermore, because Barnaby would not

75. See, e.g., Robinson, supra note 14, at 51–54 (arguing that the reasons theory does not
protect third parties who forcibly prevent an actor from using force against another in a
reasonable but mistaken belief in that actor’s right to self-defense).
76. It might be added that under the common law, and in many contemporary statutory
formulations, the duress defense is unavailable in homicide cases. See, e.g., WAYNE R. LAFAVE,
CRIMINAL LAW § 5.3(b), at 468–69 & nn.12–13 (3d ed. 2000) (citing authorities). Of course, this
is purely contingent.
77. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04(1) (1962) (providing that “the use of force upon
or toward another person is justifiable when the actor believes that such force is immediately
necessary for the purpose of protecting himself against the use of unlawful force by such other
person on the present occasion”); id. § 2.09(1) (extending a defense if “the actor engaged in the
conduct charged . . . because he was coerced to do so by the use of, or a threat to use, unlawful
force against his person or the person of another, that a person of reasonable firmness in his
situation would have been unable to resist”).
78. E.g., Fletcher, The Right and the Reasonable, supra note 3, at 975 (claiming “that in any
situation of physical conflict, where only one party can prevail, logic prohibits us from
recognizing that more than one of the parties could be justified in using force”).
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be avoiding the “greater” evil in, say, killing Agnes to save his
79
own life.
But none of this is convincing. As many commentators have
noted, the “incompatibility thesis”—i.e., the claim that mutually
contending parties cannot each be legally justified—is without logical
80
81
support. Whatever may be the case in morals, it is not
82
“paradoxical” for two parties each to be legally justified in using
force against the other if, as I have argued, legal justification means
only legal permission. And all the other arguments are solely appeals
to contingent positive law, not at all in the nature of logical or
necessary truths. Take the legal defense that a non-lawyer is most
likely to think apt for Barnaby—self-defense. There is not the
slightest reason to take as a given that it cannot lie in response to
justified force. To the contrary, subjectivists, who would treat Agnes
as legally justified if prosecuted for the killing of Barnaby, could
easily draft a statute that would exculpate Barnaby if he beat her to
the punch. Indeed, such a statute could be drafted so as to suggest
that Barnaby is himself legally justified, not merely excused, as
follows: An actor may use force (including deadly force) when he
believes it necessary to protect himself or another either from
unlawful force or from lawful force that the actor believes would be
unlawful were it not for a mistake on the part of the person against
whom the actor employs force.83 This is essentially (but not precisely)
79. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.02(1)(a) (“Conduct that the actor believes to be
necessary to avoid a harm or evil to himself or to another is justifiable, provided that . . . the
harm or evil sought to be avoided by such conduct is greater than that sought to be prevented by
the law defining the offense charged . . . .”).
80. E.g., Dressler, supra note 12, at 87–91; Greenawalt, supra note 12, at 1921–25; David
Dolinko, Note, Intolerable Conditions as a Defense to Prison Escapes, 26 UCLA L. REV. 1126,
1177–81 (1979).
81. For one detailed argument that valid moral justifcations cannot oppose one another in
this way, see HEIDI M. HURD, MORAL COMBAT (1999).
82. See Jeremy Waldron, Self-Defense: Agent-Neutral and Agent-Relative Accounts, 88
CAL. L. REV. 711, 726 (2000) (contending that “the paradox exists so long as the exculpation is
thought of in terms of justification”).
83. The Model Penal Code—which drafts justification defenses in terms of the actor’s
actual and reasonable beliefs, see generally MODEL PENAL CODE art. 3—tries to reach this same
result. But the fact that it does so through a more cumbersome and even unclear methodology
has fooled Robinson into concluding that the MPC “concedes the primary tenet of the ‘deeds’
theory of justification: that the nature of the deed must be taken as determinative, no matter
what the actor’s reasons for the deed.” Robinson, supra note 14, at 54. This is doubly mistaken.
First, no matter what the MPC’s approach, the provision proposed in the text demonstrates that
a legislature could reach the (presumptively) substantively correct result in cases of this sort
without taking the nature of the deed, independent of the actor’s beliefs, to be determinative.
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84
the approach taken by the Model Penal Code. Such a defense—call
it “Justification1”—is still “subjective” through and through.

Second, as it happens, the MPC’s approach does not take the nature of the deed as
determinative. To the contrary, it adopts essentially the same solution as just suggested in the
text. See infra note 84.
84. In reaching his conclusion that the MPC resorts to a deeds theory to exculpate those
who employ force against persons who act under conditions of mistaken justification, Robinson
considers the following hypothetical: A is about to assault B under the mistaken belief that it is
necessary in self-defense. Aware that A is mistaken, C assaults A just in time to prevent him
from harming B. Under a subjective theory, A’s use of force is justified, hence presumably
“lawful,” seeming to bar C’s use of force against him. According to Robinson, the MPC avoids
this plainly improper outcome through a three-step process. First, the MPC provides that C “is
not justified in interfering to defend [B] unless [B] would be justified in using the same force in
defence of himself.” Id. at 52 (citing MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.05(1)). Second, B’s use of selfdefense is justified only against “unlawful force.” Id. at 52–53 (citing MODEL PENAL CODE §
3.04(1)). Third, subjectively justified force is “unlawful” if it is not “privileged”—a term that the
MPC does not define but which the commentary suggests “is borrowed from tort law and is
intended to mean objectively justified.” Id. at 53 (citing MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.11(1) & cmt.
1, at 159 (1985)). In Robinson’s view, this third step is the key: the MPC is compelled to employ
the concept of objective justification to yield the intuitively proper result that C has a valid
defense. “This practice of the Model Penal Code of defining ‘unlawful force’ that lawfully may
be resisted as ‘privileged force,’” Robinson concludes, “makes it difficult to describe that Code
and the many like it as adopting a ‘reasons’ theory, as they first appeared to do.” Id. at 54.
I don’t think so. The first problem with Robinson’s analysis is that he misreads the MPC.
Step one under the MPC approach actually directs that C’s use of force “is justifiable to protect
a third person [here, B] when . . . under the circumstances as the actor [C] believes them to be,
the person whom he seeks to protect would be justified in using such protective force.” MODEL
PENAL CODE § 3.05(1)(b) (emphasis added). (To be more precise, and to accommodate
situations in which C believes both that B is imperiled and that B is unaware of that peril, the
Code should have added: “ . . . were that person aware of the circumstances that the actor
believes to obtain.” But that slight oversight is not directly relevant to the instant hypothetical
and can be safely ignored.) This has important consequences. To see that, consider these four
possibilities: (1) A mistakenly believes that B is an aggressor, and C correctly believes that B is
not; (2) A and C both mistakenly believe that B is an aggressor; (3) A correctly believes that B is
not an aggressor, while C mistakenly believes that he is; and (4) A and C both correctly believe
that B is not an aggressor. Were C prosecuted for assault under the MPC, in each of these four
cases it will be C’s beliefs that are determinative of his criminal liability: he has a valid
justificatory defense in those cases and only in those cases where he believes that B is not an
aggressor—i.e., cases (1) and (4), but not (2) or (3). One might disagree with any of these
outcomes as a matter of policy. But the descriptive claim that, under the MPC, objective facts,
not subjective beliefs are determinative, is false. A defendant’s actual beliefs, not objective facts,
determine outcomes under the MPC, though such beliefs must be reasonable to afford complete
exculpation. See id. § 3.09(2) (making the defense unavailable in prosecutions for offenses for
which liability is predicated on negligence or recklessness if the actor negligently or recklessly
believed in his right to use self-defense).
In light of all this, how could Robinson conclude that the MPC’s “approach to mistake as
to a justification ought to be termed one of only a ‘reasons’ terminology rather than a ‘reasons’
theory’”? Robinson, supra note 14, at 54. To answer this question, a slight digression will be
required. Notice that the last sentence of the preceding paragraph refers to a defendant’s actual
beliefs; it does not say “actual beliefs,” full stop. There’s a reason for that. Let’s be clear about
what a subjective or reasons theory is a theory about. It’s a theory about the circumstances that
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fanciful

A fanatical terrorist . . . has killed a number of people and is now
holed up in a building surrounded by police. . . .
Unfortunately, the terrorist has a hostage, and he is determined to
move out of the house using the hostage as a human shield. He
knows that there is a good chance that the police will try to kill him
even if this means shooting through the body of the innocent
hostage. Devilishly, he explains the situation to the hostage and
convinces him that either they will both escape together or they will
both die together. He gives the hostage a pistol with which he can
shoot back at any police officers who may try to shoot (through)
him, assuring him of course that if he even so much as makes a move

matter when determining whether a criminal defendant has a valid justificatory defense. And
the answer that the subjective or reasons theory provides is that justifications in the criminal law
depend upon the actual beliefs or reasons of the actor claiming the defense. A subjective or
reasons theory is not committed to the view that all facts made relevant in criminal prosecutions
must be assessed from the subjective viewpoint of some party to the relevant events as opposed
to the (more) objective viewpoint of the factfinder. To see what I mean consider a very different
example. Like many penal codes, the MPC makes it a felony for a male to have consensual
sexual intercourse with a female under sixteen if the male is at least four years her senior.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.3(1)(a). Suppose that the defendant, a nineteen-year-old male, has
consensual sex with a girl he knows to be fifteen. Nobody would think that the MPC’s subjective
approach to justifications would commit it to exculpate the defendant if the girl believed that he
was eighteen. Consideration of the beliefs of persons other than the defendant himself is not
what is entailed by a subjective theory of justification.
I emphasize this because Robinson is surely right that, under MPC § 3.11(1), the
defendant’s beliefs that matter are beliefs about what might be called objective justification. If C
believes (correctly) that A is acting on certain honest but mistaken beliefs that make him, A,
subjectively justified but not objectively so, C has a valid defense in assaulting A. But Robinson
is wrong in thinking that this particular reliance on objective facts is inconsistent with a
subjective theory of justification. The only reason Robinson’s argument on this point looks any
more plausible than the obviously false contention advanced by our hypothetical nineteen-yearold rape defendant (that the girl’s mistake should win him exculpation) is because of the
assumption that all theorists, subjectivist or objectivist, are necessarily committed to the claim
that conduct is “not unlawful” if criminally justified. Yet this is false. It is arguably an analytic
truth that conduct is “not criminal” if criminally justified. (But see the debate over the closure
view of justifications, supra note 11.) But the law as a whole consists of various, discrete,
normative systems. Much conduct not criminal is nonetheless unlawful. (So even though this
Article sometimes treats “criminally justified” as equivalent to “legally justified,” that is an
imprecision tolerated for simplicity of exposition.) The point of MPC § 3.11 is essentially to
make clear that action that is criminally excused and even criminally justified may still be
unlawful for purposes of being conduct that one might forcefully resist. I happen to think that
the formulation proposed earlier, supra note 83 and accompanying text, conveys that point
more felicitously than does the MPC, but there is no basis for denying that the MPC’s theory of
justification remains subjective.
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to turn the pistol on his captor he (the terrorist) will kill him
instantly. . . .
[Thus arrayed, the terrorist and hostage start to leave the building
and immediately encounter a police officer.] All three individuals
grasp the situation in a flash, and all three begin firing: the terrorist
and his hostage firing at the officer, the officer firing at and through
the hostage. Each of them is shooting to kill. None of them is under
85
any misapprehension of fact.

Waldron takes for granted that the police officer would be justified,
and that the terrorist would not. But what about the hostage?
Supposing he knows that the officer is perfectly justified in firing at
86
him, does he have a defense if he proves the quicker shot and is later
brought up on charges of homicide or assault?
Under Justification1 proposed above, he is not justified. The
officer’s force is lawful, and the hostage cannot believe that its
lawfulness depends upon any mistake of fact. I’m disposed to think
that outcome sound, though it might remain sensible and just for the
hostage to be adjudged excused. This result could be realized, for
example, by extending the defense of duress to an actor who
succumbs to pressures (not amounting to the use or threatened use of
unlawful force) that a person of reasonable firmness in his situation
87
could not have resisted. It hardly bears mention, I hope, that there is
no inconsistency in concluding that the hostage should not be justified
but should be exculpated on grounds of excuse. When the law accords
the hostage an excuse, but not a justification, the state is purporting to
command persons in such situations not to defend themselves. And
although such a demand might appear only nominal in light of the
awaiting excuse, in theory it could produce different outcomes in a
world of committed rule-followers, which (in our actual world of
acoustic integration) is at least some of the gist of the difference
between conduct rules and decision rules.

85. Waldron, supra note 82, at 714 (adapting the hypothetical from one proposed in
KADISH, supra note 8, at 122–23).
86. To be more precise, you need suppose only that the hostage knows the facts that make
out the officer’s justification; it is not important that the hostage knows as well that, on those
facts, the officer has a justification in law.
87. Cf. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.09(1) (providing the defense of duress to an actor who
accedes to threats of unlawful force “which a person of reasonable firmness in his situation
would have been unable to resist”).
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But perhaps you disagree. You might agree that the hostage is
not blameworthy and does not deserve the stigma of a criminal
conviction. However if you anticipate that few hostages would be
influenced by the criminal law in such circumstances, you might
believe that even a merely ostensible command not to fire is foolish
and risks bringing the criminal law into disrepute. For these reasons
(or others) you might conclude that the law should grant the hostage
a justification and not merely an excuse. Because (as we have just
seen) Justification1 does not grant the hostage a justification defense,
you might conclude further that a subjective approach to justifications
(which Justification1 exemplifies) commits one to an unduly
restrictive conception of justification. This would be a mistake. Even
if Justification1 does not cover the hostage, there is no reason why it
could not be supplemented. For example, the legislature could
provide—codified, say, as “Justification2”—that an actor is justified in
using force in self-defense when he is the non-aggressor and believes
it necessary to protect himself against another’s use of force.
So it does not appear that Justification1 commits the subjectivist
to an unduly restrictive permission for self-defense. But does it
commit her to an overly generous formulation? Suppose that
Constable is on his way to arrest Outlaw, who is known to be armed
and dangerous. Doppelganger, an innocent man who just happens to
be a dead ringer for Outlaw, sees Constable coming. Because Outlaw
has killed other officers attempting arrest, Constable is lawfully
authorized to subdue Outlaw by, say, firing a painful, but not lethal,
electric stun gun. Doppelganger has been listening in on a police
radio, and he understands the situation perfectly. Unfortunately,
because his jaw happens to be wired shut, he can’t communicate his
innocence to Constable. Can he shoot Constable with his own stun
gun to avoid being stunned himself?88 Justification1 would provide
Doppelganger with a defense. Although Constable’s force might be
lawful, Doppelganger believes (correctly, in fact) that it would be
unlawful but for Constable’s mistake regarding Doppelganger’s
identity. But such an outcome is not at all compelled. If the legislature
thinks this bad policy, it could amend Justification1 to specify, say,
that the use of force in self-protection “is not justifiable . . . to resist
an arrest that the actor knows is being made by a peace officer,

88. This hypothetical is adapted from one supplied in SMITH, supra note 37, at 20–21. I
have altered it to make clear that Doppelganger is not threatened with deadly force.
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89
although the arrest is unlawful.” Call this amended version of
Justification1, “Justification3.”
The point of this lengthy exploration into hypothetical subjective
justification defenses is simple. Complex cases like these raise issues
of policy to be addressed by careful legislative drafting, not issues of
90
conceptual understanding.

b. The subjectivist logical contradiction. Although it is generally
the objectivists who have urged that we are somehow compelled to
accept one particular conceptualization of justifications, Russell
Christopher has argued in a clever and original paper that objective
91
theories of justification lead to logical contradiction. In brief,
Christopher argues that when A, B, and C are shooting at one
another “around in a circle”—A at B, B at C, C at A—each unaware
that his intended victim is threatening the third person (who in turn
threatens the actor himself), Paul Robinson’s objective approach is
internally contradictory. As Christopher explains:
If C’s threat is unjustified, then B’s threat is justified in defense of A.
Therefore, A’s threat is unjustified in defense of C. Consequently,
C’s threat is justified in defense of B. But if C’s threat is justified, B’s
threat is unjustified. Therefore, A’s threat is justified. Consequently,
C’s threat is unjustified. The resulting contradiction is that if C’s
threat is unjustified, it is justified; but if C’s threat is justified, it is
92
unjustified.

Although I am personally sympathetic to subjective articulations
of the justification defense, I nonetheless think Christopher’s
argument is ultimately flawed. Whether any given actor has an
objective justification reduces, on Robinson’s account, to whether the
net societal consequences would have been worse had he not acted as
93
he did. Given this standard, it should be clear that none of the
parties is justified if each shoots and kills his victim: The outcome
would not have been worse (taking the circle as a closed system) had

89. This is the Model Penal Code’s solution. MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04(2)(a)(i).
90. See Greenawalt, supra note 22, at 20 (arguing that legislative resolution of the
subjective/objective debate—and all its possible variations—”requires delicate judgments about
fairness and desirable criminal policy, not merely wooden conceptualization”).
91. Russell L. Christopher, Self-Defense and Defense of Others, 27 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 123
(1998).
92. Id. at 129–30.
93. E.g., 2 ROBINSON, CRIMINAL LAW DEFENSES, supra note 13, at 46.
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94
any one of the three not fired. In contrast, all parties are justified if
each actor’s threat deters the next from firing, with the net result that
nobody is harmed. Indeed, no contradiction need ensue even for the
intermediate cases in which at least one, but not all, actors fire. For
just one example, imagine that A shoots B in time to moderately
injure B, sufficient to disable B from shooting C, and C shoots and
grievously injures A. C is justified on a deeds approach if and only if,
had he not shot A, (1) A would have reloaded and finished off B, and
(2) the death of B is worse (on the deeds theorists’ metric) than the
sum of moderate injury to B plus grievous injury of A. A is justified if
and only if, from a God’s-eye perspective, had A not shot B, B would
have shot and killed C, but not in time to have prevented C from
shooting and injuring A. Evaluation depends upon counterfactual
reasoning, of course. But an objective theory, like Robinson’s, that
does not rely upon notions of “moral forfeiture,” does not seem to
generate logical contradiction—at least so long as it does not also
adhere to the “incompatibility thesis” discussed earlier.95

2. On the Nature of Norms. There is a second way to rebut the
implication of the structural equivalence thesis that criminal law
justifications could be either subjective or objective, depending upon
the values, needs, and goals of a particular criminal regime. That way
is to establish that something about the nature of normative reasoning
either requires or forbids that norms be sensitive to beliefs as against
objective facts. Put otherwise, one could argue that the nature of
normativity itself entails that justifications must be subjective or must
be objective.
Paul Robinson, one of most productive and creative criminal
theorists of the day, is perhaps the chief proponent of this view. At
first blush one might expect to count him among the scholars most
receptive to the claims, first, that the distinction between justification
and excuse just is the distinction between defenses that defeat
94. I do recognize that the question of justification might be thought moot in this example,
as each of the actors ends up dead. But if you don’t mind entertaining the sometimes outlandish
sorts of hypotheticals that are the staples of this literature, I suspect that you won’t mind putting
this complication aside.
95. See supra notes 80–82 and accompanying text. Robinson himself has expressly stated
that he does not endorse the incompatibility thesis. See Paul H. Robinson, The Bomb Thief and
the Theory of Justification Defenses, 8 CRIM. L.F. 387, 407 n.44 (1997) (rejecting the argument
that two actors engaged in combat cannot both be justified). But see 1 ROBINSON, supra note 13,
at 165 (“Where an aggressor has a justification defense, the proper rule is clear: justified
aggression should never be lawfully subject to resistance or interference.”).
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criminality and those that concede criminality but defeat punishability
and, second, that the significance of this distinction is captured by the
distinction between conduct rules and decision rules. After all, the
radical draft criminal code Robinson recently proposed is divided into
96
a Code of Conduct and a Code of Adjudication, a framework nearly
mirroring Dan-Cohen’s distinction between Conduct Rules and
97
Decision Rules—though without the “acoustic separation” device.
And Robinson takes pains to place justification defenses among the
98
former, and excuse defenses among the latter. Moreover, he
observed even a quarter century ago that, “[t]hough justification is
often considered a ‘defense’, it is more properly viewed as an
‘element’ of an offense in the sense that no crime can be said to have
occurred if the act is justified or, in other words, unless the act was
non-justified.”99 Yet Robinson does not draw the lesson that any
further exploration is either in the nature of policy prescription—
arguments that for reasons of sound policy, efficiency, fairness, or
what-have-you, the state should or should not criminalize certain
100
sorts of conduct —or of sociology—efforts to determine whether
particular defenses that already exist within a given criminal regime
are best understood internally as exceptions to the prima facie norms
or as exemptions from punishability. Instead, he seems to insist that,
rightly understood, justifications just are objective.101

96. See ROBINSON, supra note 7, at 183–239.
97. See id. at 207–09 (rejecting Dan-Cohen’s acoustic separation system). Acoustic
separation is discussed supra Section II.C.2.
98. Part IV of his proposed Code of Conduct concerns “Justified Violations of the Criminal
Law”; Article 22 of his Code of Adjudication addresses “Excuses.” Id. at 218–20, 226–29.
99. Robinson, supra note 1, at 273 n.32 (citation omitted). This is the type of comment that
provokes Fletcher’s concerns about “flat” reasoning. See supra note 71. But it needn’t. Despite
his perhaps unfortunate reference here to offense elements, I take Robinson to view nonjustification as an element in a finding of a criminal violation, though presumably not to a
finding of a criminal infringement. For the difference, see supra note 71.
100. This remains true even where criminal law defenses are still in the hands of judges, not
the legislature, with the caveat that judges might face additional institutional constraints on the
types of considerations that they can properly take into account.
101. At points, Robinson could be read as intimating that there exist several possible
conceptualizations of justification, none of which is inherently more valid than the others, all of
which can be argued for or against based on practical considerations. See, e.g., Robinson, supra
note 14, at 62:
It is possible to conceptualize current criminal law rules in any number of ways.
Presumably, the preferred conceptualization is the one that best advances the reason
for having a conceptual scheme, and that reason, I would argue, is to help us think
most clearly about the issues and to give us the greatest insight into their proper
formulation and application.
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Robinson’s insistence on a deeds theory of justifications stems
most directly from his substantive view that offenses should be
limited to non-mental components. Put another way, he believes that,
with few and unusual exceptions that need not concern us here, the
Code of Conduct should be crafted to exclude reference to
102
intentional and cognitive states of the actor. And that view derives
in turn from his bedrock belief that every verdict in a criminal case
sends a moral message to the community, and therefore that the law

See also id. at 48, 70 (presenting reasons to prefer the deeds theory). Under this view, he should
be understood as arguing only that the objective theory is to be preferred as more useful, in
better serving sound policy goals, including realizing the more just results, and more effectively
educating the public. But this is not, I think, the fairer reading of his work. More often he seems
to assert that the objective construction of justification does have a greater claim to truth, even
in an ideal or nonpragmatic sense. This is reflected in his repeated assertion that the deeds
theory better captures the relevant distinctions, see, e.g., id. at 48, 61—distinctions that, as far as
I can tell, are thought to exist just in the nature of things. So, for example, Robinson criticizes
the Model Penal Code’s conceptual scheme as “odd and misleading” for treating “a mistaken
belief in a justification” as justified, even though it “is identical in character to excuses.” Id. at
62. That is, he explains, “[l]abelling the mistake-as-to-a-justification defence an ‘unprivileged
justification’ suggests that it is conceptually similar to the defences of the ‘privileged
justification’ group, yet in fact it is conceptually analogous to—indeed, more than that, it is
conceptually indistinguishable from—the defences of the excuses group.” Id. (emphases
omitted; emphasis added). But, of course, whether mistaken justification is “identical in
character to excuses,”—i.e., whether they are “conceptually indistinguishable”—is precisely the
matter over which he and his opponents disagree. In light of these potentially conflicting strands
in Robinson’s characterization of the nature of the justification/excuse distinction, his recent
and intriguing work with Princeton social psychologist John Darley might signal an increasing
willingness to de-naturalize his preferred conceptualization. See, e.g., PAUL H. ROBINSON &
JOHN M. DARLEY, JUSTICE, LIABILITY, AND BLAME (1995) (comparing societal views on the
principles of criminal law with the actual provisions in legal code).
Having thus charged Robinson with sending some conflicting signals on this issue, it is
only fair that I make clear that I am myself coherentist or pragmatist regarding the truth status
of the particular conceptualization between justification and excuse for which I have been
arguing. As Grant Lamond has usefully put it, conceptual arguments are properly measured by
how convincing and illuminating an account they provide in each case—whether what
they deliver is still recognizable as an account of the phenomenon in question, how
well it succeeds in systematically linking the phenomenon to related aspects of our
understanding, and whether it deepens our comprehension of the phenomenon.
Grant Lamond, The Coerciveness of Law, 20 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 39, 47 (2000). In saying
this, I do not mean to enter into the debate lately raging among legal philosophers regarding
whether conceptual analysis of law depends upon substantive moral evaluation. See generally
JULIE DICKSON, EVALUATION AND LEGAL THEORY (2001) (summarizing the debate and
advocating analysis of the law “as is” before direct moral evaluation). It seems to me that not
even an affirmative answer to that question would entail that we need recourse to more than the
epistemic values of simplicity, coherence, clarity, and the like, in order to evaluate competing
accounts of the concepts that law employs.
102. See ROBINSON, supra note 7, at 129–37, 185–86 (proposing to eliminate culpability
requirements from the definitions of most offenses).
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should be structured so as to make that message as clear and accurate
103
as possible.
To this end, Robinson envisions five distinct jury verdicts in an
ideal system of criminal law: (1) not guilty because no violation; (2)
not guilty because justified violation; (3) not guilty by blameless
104
violation; (4) not punishable; and (5) guilty. No violation exists
when the state has not proven the objective/external elements of the
offense—for example, that the defendant assaulted another person,
or was in possession of cocaine, or committed an unlawful entry. A
justified violation occurs when the defendant has committed the
objective elements of an offense, but satisfies conditions of objective
justification. An unjustified violation is blameless when any one of a
number of conditions are present—that the defendant lacked
culpability because of a reasonable mistake of fact, or committed the
offense involuntarily (as by convulsion or sleepwalking), or acted
under duress or when insane.105 A blameworthy violation is
nonetheless “not punishable” when nonexculpatory defenses like the
statute of limitations or diplomatic immunity apply. In all other cases,
the defendant is guilty.
106
Focus on the distinctions among the first three verdicts.
Bracketing any doubts about the value of differentiating between “no
103. See, e.g., id. at 204–05 (discussing the need to distinguish “no violation” acquittals from
“blameless violation” and “justified violation” acquittals).
104. Id. app. B §§ 410–14.
105. Curiously, the verdict forms don’t distinguish among these, but the language of the
Code of Adjudication does. When the defendant is not at least reckless as to each element of
the violation (or, in some few situations, negligent), his “violation” is deemed “not criminal.” Id.
app. B § 200(1). When the defendant had the requisite culpability but can claim, for instance,
insanity, duress, or involuntariness, his “violation” is “excused.” Id. app. B §§ 220–28. Robinson
does not explain why the distinction between “not criminal” and “excused”—which seemingly
carries some normative flavor—is not reflected in the available verdicts, although he does note
that “there seems little benefit” in requiring the jury to specify the particular ground of
excuse—involuntariness, duress, mistake as to justification, etc.—because it would “require[]
that the jurors come to agreement on the ground of exculpation.” Id. at 146 n.3.
106. This is not to suggest that the fourth verdict—”not punishable”—is wholly
unproblematic. Although it has obvious merit, it worrisomely risks implying that the defendant
“really is” guilty but for the presence of some lawyerly type defense. (Tellingly, when Robinson
first introduces this possible verdict, he proposes to call it “guilty but not punishable.” Id. at 73.
Although it has morphed into the sparer “not punishable” by the time it is produced in
Appendix B, see id. app. B § 413, the transformation is never explained.) And that might not be
a fair inference. The ban against double jeopardy, for instance, rests partly on the judgment that
individuals should be spared the trouble and hazard of defending themselves from subsequent
criminal prosecutions, as Robinson himself recognizes. See Robinson, supra note 8, at 232 n.124.
But an “actually innocent” defendant who could avail himself of such a defense must be aware
of the message that it would send. Cf. ROBINSON, supra note 7, at 70 (describing “a logical
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107
violation” and “justified violation,” the most critical line is plainly
drawn between verdicts 1 and 2 on the one hand, and verdict 3 on the
other. Something of importance—presumably some distinct
normative message—turns upon the distinction between finding that
the defendant (a) committed no unjustified violation, or (b) is
blameless for committing an unjustified violation. Now, I am skeptical
that it makes sense even to try to use the criminal law to make such
fine-tuned moral judgments. To elaborate on a question raised by
Kent Greenawalt, what should a jury do when all jurors agree that the
defendant is not guilty—i.e., should be acquitted—but differ among
themselves regarding whether there was no violation, or a justified
violation, or a noncriminal violation, or an excused violation?108
Robinson offers no response.109

hierarchy” among justification, excuse, and nonexculpatory defenses). The “not punishable”
verdict therefore pressures him to submit to all the evils that the defense is designed to protect
him from. It is no answer that, even under existing systems, a defendant who pleads and prevails
upon a nonexculpatory defense takes the same risks. A basic premise underlying Robinson’s
enterprise is that the existing system does not send such messages clearly enough. See supra note
103 and accompanying text.
107. Robinson does not explain precisely what evaluative coloration this distinction is
intended to capture. By intimating that there exists some normative difference between the two,
however, he seems to ally himself with the minority view that a justification qualifies
wrongfulness without negating it. See supra note 11.
108. See, e.g., Greenawalt, supra note 12, at 1900–01 (observing that, except in cases of
acquittal on the basis of mental disease, juries are generally not obliged to explain the grounds
for acquittal, and arguing that introducing such a practice would confront substantial obstacles);
Greenawalt, supra note 22, at 17–18 (same).
109. In an argument that deserves to be quoted at length, Robinson exploits precisely this
problem in an effort to tarnish the subjective approach to justification. Under the Model Penal
Code, Robinson explains:
An actor’s conduct is ‘justifiable’ if it is within the rules of conduct (‘privileged’) or if
it violates the rules of conduct under the actual facts (unprivileged) but the actor
mistakenly believes that it is justified. Because of this formulation of justification
defences, a jury is never asked to determine whether the conduct is objectively
proper. The jury need only determine whether the actor’s conduct was either in fact
proper, or improper but he believed that it was proper. (Note that the members of the
jury need not even agree among themselves as to which of these two alternatives is
true. Thus, even the members of the jury, then, may not be able to clarify an
ambiguous acquittal.) The ultimate effect of this is that, even if a more refined verdict
system were in place, the Code’s subjective formulation of justification defences
leaves it unclear whether a jury should select a no-violation or a blameless-violation
verdict.
ROBINSON, supra note 7, at 147–48 (footnote omitted). But Robinson does not seem to fully
appreciate the force of his parenthetical note. When jurors disagree among themselves about
underlying facts, the jury will always find it unclear which form of exculpatory verdict to select
no matter how the justification defenses are formulated. Put otherwise, Robinson’s assertion that,
“[w]ith proper organization, a code of adjudication easily can” distinguish among these types of
acquittals, id. at 204 (emphasis added), misses the point: the actual adjudications often can’t.
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Even supposing that such fine-tuning is possible and desirable,
the content of the different categories is more than dubious. To start,
as Jeremy Horder has cogently argued, it seems morally senseless to
110
include involuntariness on the disfavored side of this divide.
Suppose Lisa is charged with having “cause[d] bodily injury . . . to
another person” (in violation of § 3 of Robinson’s Code of
111
Conduct). If a jury determines that she did so only because forcibly
(and maliciously) propelled by her older brother Bart, it is ridiculous
for the legal system to seek to transmit a message that Lisa is entitled
to anything less than top-drawer exculpation.
Or, imagine matters before the incident. Picture the hypothetical
112
public education classes of which Robinson is fond. Suppose the
students are collectively reading the Code of Conduct, and precocious
Lisa asks: What would happen if my brother Bart were to pick me up
and throw me into Milhouse? Consistent with Robinson’s vision, the
teacher would have to answer that Lisa would be found to have
violated the Criminal Code (tsk, tsk!), but (not to worry!) would be
adjudged “blameless” for this violation. Wouldn’t the children think
that crazily unfair? And wouldn’t they be right? If so, the upshot is
not trivial. It reveals that Robinson’s mapping of the Codes of
Conduct and Adjudication onto the distinction between ex ante and
ex post perspectives is too facile. Even from an ex ante perspective,
citizens are imagining the ex post situation. And one fundamental
question in which they’ll be interested is this: Will I be found to have
violated the criminal law or not?113
If the above is true, then perhaps more than a requirement of
voluntariness ought to be moved into the Code of Conduct. For the
same is arguably true about culpability determinations. Again, Lisa
might wonder: What if I cause structural damage to the school by
110. See Jeremy Horder, Criminal Law and Legal Positivism, 8 LEGAL THEORY 221, 229
(2002) (criticizing Robinson for placing involuntariness among the excuses “because only
wrongdoing needs excuse, and the involuntariness of conduct actually undermines the
wrongfulness . . . of conduct. . . . because what is wrong is something there is reason not to do,
and involuntary conduct is not sensitive to the guiding influence of reason”).
111. See ROBINSON, supra note 7, app. A § 3 (Draft Code of Conduct, “Injury to a Person”).
112. See, e.g., id. at 156 (advocating the promulgation of simple rules of conduct to be
discussed in school children’s “citizenship classes”).
113. Cf. CANE, supra note 10, at 93:
[T]he criminal law is as much concerned with telling us what our responsibilities are
as with deciding whether, in particular cases, we should be subject to sanctions for not
performing those responsibilities. The law gives us goals to aim at, while at the same
time offering reassurance that failure to meet those goals will not necessarily attract
legal sanctions.
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inadvertently carrying in an explosive device that Bart has secreted in
my lunch box? And, again, the Robinsonian answer would be that
114
Lisa will have violated the Code of Conduct, but will be adjudged
“Not Guilty by Reason of Blameless Violation.”115 Yet if, as Horder
has argued, it is senseless to conceive of involuntary action as
violating the Code of Conduct, the very same is arguably true of nonculpable voluntary conduct.116 If Lisa did not suspect—indeed (if it
matters) where nobody would have suspected—that her lunch box
contained a bomb, it may be thought normatively obtuse to saddle
her with the relative stigma that must attach to anything less than the
most robust form of exculpation the system makes available.117 Even if
114. See ROBINSON, supra note 7, app. A § 24 (Draft Code of Conduct, “Damage to or
Theft of Property”).
115. See id. app. B § 220 (Draft Code of Conduct, “Disability Excuse: Involuntary
Conduct”); id. app. B § 412 (Draft Code of Adjudication, “Verdict Form: Blameless
Violation”).
116. I leave open whether non-reckless conduct is non-culpable, or whether, in order not to
be culpable, the conduct must be nonnegligent as well.
117. I suspect that those who believe that voluntariness is necessarily a component of a
norm violation but that awareness is not might be misled by the confession-and-avoidance
character of excuses such as mistake of fact. Some pleas of confession and avoidance do confess
something of normative significance. Duress is the prime example: I acknowledge that I did
wrong (morally or criminally), but I’m not to blame. But not all such pleas are like that. When
Lisa confesses to having caused the school’s destruction, but pleads ignorance of the critical
facts in avoidance, she is denying not her blameworthiness, or not only this, but also the
logically prior fact of wrongfulness. Here, I think, confession and avoidance reflects only a
dialectical structure, not a normative one. The dialectical structure is created by the fact that the
accuser will naturally speak first in terms of objective or external facts, leaving it to the accused
to fill in details about her mental states and the like about which she has privileged access. That
the accuser does not, in one breath as it were, charge that the accused did x, and that she knew
she was doing x, is really a matter only of dialectical convenience; there is no normative import.
My treatment of defenses (see Figure 4) therefore relies somewhat on convention.
Conceptually, ex post normative or ascriptive assessment tends to proceed in this order: (1) are
the external requirements satisfied (e.g., did the actor trespass on another’s land; did she cause
another’s death)?; (2) if so, did she act with any of the proscribed “mental states” of purpose,
knowledge, recklessness, or negligence (i.e., can the actor claim any mistakes or accidents)?; (3)
if not, was the actor justified?; and (4) if not, was she excused? This hierarchy is familiar. What
is perhaps not familiar is that there exist significant differences in the way that one step relates
to the one preceding it. A fairly important conceptual distinction separates the latter two
questions, tracking the distinction between wrongfulness and blameworthiness. But no
consideration of comparable force separates culpability determinations from justifications (steps
(2) and (3)). Thus, once we determine (which we need not) that justifications should be treated
as defenses and associated closely with excuses, there is no reason in principle that culpability
determinations could not join them. Put another way, the distinction between infringement and
violation—culpability determinations going to the former, justifications going to the latter—may
be supported more by intuitive, largely unarticulated, notions of statistical ordinariness, and by
simple convention, than by anything of greater normative substance. This truth is reflected in
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no stigma is thought to apply, a rule that does not presuppose the
actor’s awareness of the preconditions for its applicability might be
thought either confused or otiose.
Ironically, Robinson himself can be read as lending support to
this view:
To say ‘do not use force against another unless you think the other is
attacking you’ may sound like a rule of conduct but is simply a
compression of two distinct points. The rule of conduct says ‘do not
use force unless another is attacking you’; but we understand that in
application you can only act on what you know or believe. That
second issue, of belief, is not an issue that one must deal with in
stating the rule of conduct; it only becomes relevant in adjudicating
118
failures to follow the rule (to satisfy the ideal).

This is an important passage. If we understand (as we should) that
one can only be expected to act on what she believes (which is not
inconsistent with imposing a duty, itself triggered by what the actor
believes, to gather more information under specified circumstances),
then the reason that one need not deal with issues of belief “in stating
the rule of conduct” is only because such issues are already implied.
So, it’s not that issues of belief aren’t incorporated into the conduct
rules (the statement of the norms), but rather that they need not be
incorporated explicitly because the implication of their inclusion is
already so strong. Issues of belief do, as Robinson acknowledges,
become relevant at the stage of adjudication.119 But that is not through
the application of any ancillary rule; it is from attending to the
primary norm’s necessary implication.
The bottom line, I suggest, is this. It may make sense to fine-tune
verdicts so as to distinguish exculpations based on the absence of
violation from exculpations for reason of blamelessness. But even if
so, want of the minimum requisite culpability (usually recklessness or
negligence) should probably make out the former if, as Robinson
120
insists, the criminal law’s educative function is so critical. When an
the still-incomplete historical transition of issue (2) from defenses (under the guise of “mistakes
of fact”) to offense elements (as per Model Penal Code-style kinds of culpability).
118. Robinson, supra note 14, at 64–65.
119. See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
120. Over a decade ago, Robinson acknowledged his critics’ suggestion that some mental
components should go within the rules of conduct, see Paul H. Robinson, Rules of Conduct and
Principles of Adjudication, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 729, 736 n.9 (1990), but demurred largely on the
ground that “[t]he harmfulness of conduct does not always depend on the actor’s subjective
state of mind,” id. at 738.
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actor makes mistakes (at least nonnegligent ones) about elements, the
criminal law should not be deemed violated. And that conclusion has
major implications for the construction of justification defenses. Even
if “every case adjudication” should be viewed as a vehicle “to tell the
community which conduct is approved (‘justified’) and which conduct
is disapproved even though the offender at hand may not be punished
121
for it (‘excused’),” it is very doubtful that a pure “deeds theory”
does it accurately.
In thus denying Robinson’s claim that justifications must be
objective, I do not mean, however, to assert the more nearly opposite
position that they must be subjective, i.e., that it is part of the nature
of a prescriptive norm that it must assume the world as perceived by
the norm’s addressee. I have endeavored merely to highlight some
reasons why a culture might want to understand its norms in such a
way. I have tried to explain, in other words, why any nonnegligent
mistakes about justification that the society’s criminal law in fact
codifies as defenses might be better understood as themselves
justifications, not excuses. It does not follow, though, that there exist
no reasons why a culture would want its norms to hold subjects to a
higher standard of conduct, one predicated upon an idealization of
122
their epistemic situation. Trade-offs, after all, are unavoidable.
Whereas a radically subjective construction of norms is most
sympathetic to the regime’s subjects, a radically objective
construction is more aspirational. It is hard to see what it would be
about the nature of normativity that would fix as necessary one or
another position with regard to this trade-off.123
In short, it seems perfectly coherent for a norm to accommodate
the actual or reasonable beliefs, even if mistaken, of its addressees in
121. ROBINSON, supra note 7, at 123–24.
122. Strictly speaking, this would not run afoul of the maxim that “ought implies can,” for an
actor could act in accord with guiding reasons even if she does not apprehend the facts that
make those reasons applicable to her situation. Of course, the proximity with which the
objective vision of norms comes to violating that bedrock principle of normative reasoning
might persuade many against that vision. On the other hand, objectivists could take that same
proximity as weighing against ought-implies-can itself.
123. As Joshua Dressler puts it, “[a] society realistically cannot ask more of people than to
act in conformity with reasonable appearances.” Dressler, supra note 12, at 93. This could be
quibbled with. Perhaps it is more accurate to say that a society cannot realistically ask more of
people than to act in conformity with their actual perceptions, after having made appropriate
(reasonable?) efforts to verify whether those perceptions are accurate. In any event, the
qualifier realistically is doing a lot of work. The nub of the disagreement between subjectivists
and objectivists, I suggest, precisely concerns how realistic a normative system must, or
should, be.
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directing behavior, or to hold addressees to a higher idealized
standard. A particular normative regime could develop with either
orientation without violating anything essential to normativity. If so,
whether a given society and its norm entrepreneurs (such as the legal
elites responsible for its criminal law) should conceive of its criminal
law in subjective or objective terms should depend upon arguments of
political morality and practicality. It will be easier for all
contributors—Robinson included—to focus on the merits of his
argument if it is more clearly detached from arguments about
124
conceptual or logical necessity. Those are red herrings.

124. This position—that the subjectivists and objectivists are engaged in a debate over what
legal prohibitions should look like and how norms should be understood, and not about the
inherent meaning or nature of justification—contradicts John Gardner’s claim in a provocative
recent article that, as a matter of practical reasoning, a justification exists only when subjective
and objective requirements are both satisfied. See Gardner, supra note 14, at 106. Although a
complete response cannot be attempted here, some remarks are in order.
Gardner holds, in brief, that “from whatever point of view one claims justification for
one’s actions or beliefs, one claims justification only if one claims both that there were, from
that point of view, reasons for one to act or believe as one did and that one’s reasons for
performing the act or holding the belief were among these reasons.” Id. Effectively anticipating
my suggestion that a justification could lie under the criminal law when supported by guiding
reasons but not explanatory ones, or conversely, Gardner responds that
even if English criminal law were found to use the word ‘justification’ in some
different, technical sense, that would be a matter of little concern for present
purposes. Our interest is not in the legal meaning of the word ‘justification’. Our
interest is in the ordinary phenomenon, that of justification, which still plays a major
role in the thinking of most criminal courts, and indeed in evaluative thinking at large,
whatever the local lawyers and legal commentators may choose to call it.
Id. I am skeptical, however, that the prospect that justifications need not require the
conjunction of objective and subjective considerations can be waved away quite so easily.
Gardner is surely correct that the relevant question is not how criminal law practitioners
use the word “justification.” (For one thing, if the concept of legal justification does not loom
large for them, they may use the word, unreflectively, as referring only to moral justification.)
But nor is it, as Gardner apparently would have it, what justification means in some ideal sense
abstracted from the context of the criminal law. In my view, the question that animates the
literature to which Gardner purports to respond concerns how to describe the conceptual
structure or logic that already shapes extant criminal law. And insofar as this is our interest, then
Gardner’s assertion that a legal system which drafts or conceives justifications in wholly
objective (or, one might add, wholly subjective) terms is “a legal system which, strictly speaking,
does not care about justification at all,” id. at 118, seems nonresponsive. More precisely, it
responds only by denying the underlying intuition that such a system, just by virtue of being a
normative system, necessarily “cares about” justification in at least some sense. Therefore,
before accepting Gardner’s answer, it behooves us at least to search for a sense of justification
that accommodates the intuition. The revised conception here advanced—pursuant to which a
justification defense defeats the presumption that given conduct is criminal—meets that need.
We have, then, two competing conceptions of justifications under the criminal law. And before
we can claim that one is not “strictly speaking” faithful to the meaning of justification, I should
think we need some explicit criteria for choosing between conceptual schemata. While I could
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B. Unknowing Justification
The converse of the mistaken (or “putative”) justification
problem arises when an actor assaults another person under
circumstances that would allow the actor a justification had he known
125
of the relevant facts, but he did not. This situation of “unknowing
justification” is often called the “Dadson problem” after the famous
1850 case in which a police officer was prosecuted for shooting a man
in flight from the commission of a petty theft.126 The criminal code
authorized officers to shoot escaping felons, but this minor larceny
wasn’t classified as a felony unless the thief was a third-time offender.
It turns out that, unbeknownst to Constable Dadson at the time, the
thief did have several prior felony convictions, and so was committing
a felony. The claimed justification was held unavailable, however, and
Dadson was convicted of shooting with intent to cause grievous
bodily harm.127
Again, whether this was the proper outcome represents a
straightforward question of criminal law policy (broadly understood):
Is it worth criminal law resources, and is it consistent with our
principles of criminal justice, to require actual belief in the
128
circumstances that, if believed, would justify harm-causing conduct?

not hope to do justice to the issue here, it does seem to me that, insofar as we can appeal only to
intuition and utility, the more catholic account here presented stacks up well.
125. A reasons approach would require, in addition, that such knowledge constitute the
motivation or explanatory reason for the actor’s conduct. See supra note 14.
126. Regina v. Dadson, 4 Cox C.C. 360 (Crim. App. 1850).
127. Id. at 361. In a much more recent instance of unknowing justification, an Israeli thief
stole an innocent-looking backpack left in public only to discover that it contained a terrorist
bomb, which he subsequently reported to the police. The thief was thought to have saved many
lives and was not prosecuted, thereby saving the Israeli courts from having to confront the
Dadson problem themselves. See generally Robinson, supra note 95.
128. As J.C. Smith argued, the question “was whether the defence on which Dadson relied
requires . . . knowledge of the facts which justify the arrest and the use of force to effect it. This,
I suggest, is a matter of policy. There is no rule of logic which requires it to be answered one
way or the other.” SMITH, supra note 37, at 31; see also id. at 32 (“Whether knowledge of the
facts should be required to found a defence, be it justification or excuse, is . . . a matter of
policy.”). I think Smith entirely correct, although it seems to me that things become muddied a
bit when Smith responds to a reductio advanced by Glanville Williams. Williams had declared
the result in Dadson absurd on the ground that it would follow that “a British soldier who kills
an enemy in action, believing himself to be killing his own drill-sergeant, is guilty of murder.”
GLANVILLE WILLIAMS, CRIMINAL LAW 25 (2d ed. 1961). In response, Smith agreed that a
murder conviction in the latter case would be preposterous, but distinguished the two cases on
the grounds that “[m]urder has for centuries been defined as the killing of a person ‘under the
Queen’s peace,’” and that “[a]n enemy soldier making war against the Queen is not under the

BERMAN.DOC

2003]

01/30/04 9:04 AM

JUSTIFICATION AND EXCUSE

59

It is easy enough to draft a statute that provides for either of these
outcomes. Ruminations about the inherent meaning or true nature of
129
justification would not seem to advance the debate.
But again, Robinson offers a hypothetical designed to show that
the subjective view—which withholds justification when the
defendant is unaware of facts that, if known, would make out a
130
justification—gives “improper results.” Imagine, he proposes, that
B is poised to attack A, thereby conferring upon A a justification
defense under the deeds approach. A is unaware of this danger.
Coincidentally, however, and for his own bad reasons, A decides to
assault B. Bystander C knows all of the foregoing. He knows, that is,
that A is an “unknowingly justified actor.”131 Nonetheless, because C
prefers B to A, he assaults A to prevent A’s assault upon B. Does C
have a defense? Robinson thinks it obvious that he shouldn’t.132 But,
he says, the reasons theory would confer one: Because A doesn’t
know that he would be justified in assaulting B, his force upon B is
unlawful, thereby permitting C to resist it—even though C knows that
B is an assailant.133
There is much to say in response. First, why A is objectively
justified, rather than B, is not transparently obvious. It has been
doubted that this conclusion reflects an underlying fact of the matter,
134
rather than mere narrative thrust. But even if we accept Robinson’s
Queen’s peace so an element in the definition of the crime of murder is missing.” SMITH, supra
note 37, at 30–31.
Instead of deferring to this contingent definition of murder in a manner that would seem
to naturalize it, Smith would have done better, it seems to me, to make clear that the absurdity
of convicting the soldier of murder—if absurd it be—would arise simply from bad policy, not
conceptual error. This would be more consistent with his apt conclusion that
“[p]olicy” should surely determine whether this person is guilty of a crime, or of no
crime. If, as a matter of policy, we think he was truly “justified” in doing what he did,
it should be no crime. But if policy requires him to be convicted, it should surely be of
the consummated crime [rather than of an attempt].
Id. at 44.
129. Cf. Anthony M. Dillof, Unraveling Unknowing Justification, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1547, 1556–58, 1599 (2002) (criticizing what he calls “definitional arguments” in favor of another
approach, called the “harm theory,” to the unknowing justification problem).
130. Robinson, supra note 14, at 59.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. For an intriguing argument that the deeds theory produces logical contradiction in
Dadson-type cases, see Russell L. Christopher, Unknowing Justification and the Logical
Necessity of the Dadson Principle in Self-Defence, 15 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 229, 239–45
(1995). Again, I think Christopher’s inventive argument is flawed. Very briefly, it seems to me
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premise that A and not B is objectively justified, it is still unclear that
C is not permitted to interfere with A’s (subjectively unjustified)
efforts to kill B. I should think it depends mightily upon the nature of
C’s interference. It is perhaps telling, therefore, that while Robinson
says that B “intends to kill” A, and that A “draws a gun to shoot” B,
he consistently refers to C’s action only in terms of “resistance” and
135
It would seem that an objective theory of
“interference.”
justification that purports to turn on the realization of net societal
benefits would find C justified if his interference inflicts less harm on
A than A would otherwise have inflicted upon B.136
Finally and most importantly, even supposing that C kills A to
protect B, there is not the slightest reason why a subjective approach
to justification need provide C with a defense. A penal code could
provide, for instance, that an actor may not use force against a person
in response to force that the actor believes would be lawful were it
not for that other person’s mistaken beliefs about the circumstances
in which he acts. That the Model Penal Code appears not to reach this
same result is, at most, a criticism of that particular code;137 it does not
tell against subjective constructions of justification defenses
more generally.
that, contrary to Christopher’s assertions, id. at 244, an objectivist has access to a perfectly
coherent notion of the initial aggressor, one that turns on the particular point in time at which
an actor consciously determines to employ force. Still, because adequate development of this
argument would require more space than is here warranted, I am satisfied to leave this as a
partly open question.
135. Robinson, supra note 14, at 59.
136. Bear in mind that the law would not permit C to allow B to inflict any further injury
upon A after C has successfully nullified A’s threat to B. Both tort law and criminal law would
impose upon C an affirmative duty to try to protect A from B if C’s interference leaves A unable
to protect himself against B.
137. Robinson is probably right that, under the MPC, C could be exculpated even if he
employs deadly force. But that outcome is not for the reasons he gives. Robinson claims that,
under the MPC, C “lawfully can interfere with conduct that is ‘unlawful’.” Robinson, supra note
14, at 59 (citing MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.06). Assuming that this citation reflects a
typographical error (section 3.06 concerns the use of force for the protection of property), and
that the intended citation is to section 3.05, we have already seen that this is not so. See supra
note 83. Section 3.05 provides that C lawfully can protect B against unlawful force only if, under
the circumstances as C believes them to be, B “would be justified in using such protective
force.” MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.05(1)(b) (1962). And B would not be justified in using deadly
force against A if his intent to kill A is deemed to have “provoked the use of force against
himself in the same encounter.” Id. § 3.04(2)(b)(i). I’d be inclined to say that A’s lack of
awareness of the potentially provocative circumstances prevents satisfaction of this provision,
which is why I believe that Robinson’s bottom-line judgment about the Model Penal Code is
correct. But it could be easily corrected without having to resort to an objective
conceptualization of the defense.
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Even were Robinson to become convinced that no desired
outcome in complex unknowing-justification cases is beyond the
reach of a subjectivist approach, that would be unlikely to give him
pause. For even in those contexts (of mistaken justification), where he
already does recognize that purely subjective approaches can be
modified to reach the outcomes he deems substantively proper, he
disparages such approaches by emphasizing that they require “fancy
138
139
dancing” or “complicated manoeuvres.” In fact, Robinson too
must resort to some fairly recondite legal drafting to ensure that the
140
objective approach produces the intuitively correct outcomes. But
that, to my mind, is no criticism of the objective approach generally,
nor of Robinson’s proposal in particular. Because it’s no easier in the
138. Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, Testing Competing Theories of Justification, 76
N.C. L. REV. 1095, 1102 (1998).
139. Robinson, supra note 14, at 60.
140. This is best exemplified by a straightforward case of unknowing justification. Although
the actor is objectively justified, Robinson has recognized that full exculpation would be
inappropriate and has therefore argued repeatedly that the actor should be convicted of an
attempted offense. See, e.g., Robinson, supra note 14, at 57–58; Robinson, supra note 1, at 291;
Robinson & Darley, supra note 138, at 1101. Remarkably, however, his own proposed Codes of
Conduct and Adjudication appear not to produce that result. Most persons who are objectively
but unknowingly justified would be fully exculpated under Part IV of the Code of Conduct,
which makes actual necessity the touchstone for the valid use of defensive force. See ROBINSON,
supra note 7, app A. Part IV (Draft Code of Conduct, “Justified Violations of the Criminal
Law”). To realize his desired outcome, then, Robinson would have to rely upon something like
the Model Penal Code’s impossible attempt provision, which provides that an actor “is guilty of
an attempt to commit a crime if, acting with the kind of culpability otherwise required for
commission of the crime, he purposely engages in conduct that would constitute the crime if the
attendant circumstances were as he believes them to be.” MODEL PENAL CODE § 501(1)(a); see,
e.g., Robinson, supra note 14, at 57 (citing this provision favorably for resolving cases of
unknowing justification). But as persons who have taught this provision know, it is hardly free
of “gyrations,” id. at 53, and nonetheless remains far from pellucid. Most particularly, it raises
all the uncertainties that attend identification of “attendant circumstances.”
For another illustration, consider this hypothetical proposed by Kent Greenawalt:
“Imagine that David, wishing to die as an apparent victim, has cleverly set things up so that
Vicki will think David is trying to shoot her and will shoot him in return.” Greenawalt, supra
note 12, at 1924. If Evelyn, who had known of David’s plan, happens upon the scene
immediately after Vicki has drawn her gun, may Evelyn shoot Vicki? If David himself changes
his mind after Vicki draws her gun, and decides he wants to live, should he be legally permitted
to shoot her dead? See also Greenawalt, supra note 22, at 23 (advancing a similar hypothetical).
A deeds theory would appear to answer both questions in the affirmative, given that Vicki’s
threatened use of force is only “excused” and thus “unlawful.” But I should think it absurd to
acquit either Vicki or David. As best I can tell, though, Robinson’s Rules of Conduct and
Adjudication lead to precisely that result in the case of Vicki. What result would obtain in
David’s case, especially in light of Section 240 (“Causing the Conditions of One’s Own
Justification or Excuse”), I leave for the intrepid reader to determine. See ROBINSON, supra
note 7, app. B § 240 (Draft Code of Adjudication, “Causing the Conditions of One’s Own
Justification or Excuse”).
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criminal law than elsewhere to draft a statute adequate for all
contingencies, only a peculiarly naïve vision of law would take
statutory complexity as a signal either of conceptual poverty or
disingenuousness.
In sum, a desire to reach certain intuitively proper results—in
situations of mistaken justification and unknowing justification
alike—does not logically compel adoption of subjective or objective
conceptions of legal justification. This is one of the principal lessons
of the revised conception of the justification/excuse distinction.
IV. FURTHER IMPLICATIONS
Although much of the literature on justification and excuse
focuses on the subjective/objective debate, that question does not
exhaust commentators’ interest. This Part scrutinizes two other oftendiscussed issues. Section A demonstrates that, on the revised account,
classifying a particular defense as justification or excuse entails no
necessary consequences for the treatment of third parties. Section B
returns to issues of taxonomy. After cautioning against efforts to
classify existing defenses like “self-defense” and “defense of
property,” it turns attention to two defenses the proper classification
of which has consumed substantial scholarly attention—the quasidefense of provocation that reduces murder to voluntary
manslaughter, and the true defense of duress that affords full
exculpation. This Section provides reasons to conclude that each is
better classified as an excuse.
A. Third Parties
One frequent claim about the essential or logical relationship
between justification and excuse goes like this: When conduct is
protected by a justification defense, third parties may help the actor,
and may not hinder her; when conduct is excused, third parties may
hinder, and may not help.141 Of course, the analysis of Part III
demonstrates that this is not necessarily so when the actor and the
third party have different factual beliefs. If we are now to confront
new issues worth additional comment, the claim at issue must be that
where an actor (A) and a third party (C) share the same perceptions
about a given situation, then if A is justified, C may help him and may
141. See, e.g., LEO KATZ, BAD ACTS AND GUILTY MINDS 65 (1987); Dressler, supra note
12, at 77; Greenawalt, supra note 12, at 1918.
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not hinder him, and if A is only excused, then C may not help him and
may hinder him. If A is neither justified nor excused, of course, C also
may not help, and may hinder. Call this (multi-part) claim the
“necessary implication” thesis. Is it true? If so, what does that reveal?
Whether it is true depends upon the strength and nature of the
reasons for giving the primary actor legal permission to act. In
necessity cases, where A’s action is thought to produce greater good,
C should of course be permitted to help, and not to hinder. Take
Robinson’s example of the firebreak: A ignites B’s farm to save an
adjoining town from a raging forest fire. Surely, if A is justified, then
C must be allowed to assist. But this is due not to any necessary logic
of justifications, but rather to the specific reasons that support
granting A legal permission in the first place. If we think this is a good
thing for A to do, then we would need a reason for prohibiting C from
helping or for allowing C to hinder, and that there could be any such
142
reason deserving solicitude seems highly unlikely. In short, we
should be thinking in terms of reasons for treating the primary and
third party differently, and not for conceptual truths.
This point is best illustrated by self-defense cases. Recall Albert
who shoots and kills Bushrod in self-defense, but in circumstances in
143
which Albert knows he could have safely retreated. Let us suppose
that Albert was in his own home. One could reasonably believe both
that most people will retreat if they can, no matter what the law
allows, and that ex post adjudications of whether safe retreat would
have been possible are too likely either to produce false positives
(thus resulting in punishment of morally and legally innocent
persons) or to put excessive pressure on law-abiding folk to attempt
retreats that are in fact unsafe. For these reasons, I argued, a rational
law might refrain from imposing a duty of retreat in one’s own home
(though I should add that a contrary rule would also be defensible). If
the law takes that approach, Albert has a valid defense of self-defense
and is, legally speaking, justified.
Suppose now that Clarisse, Albert’s neighbor, happens to be
over for coffee, and that both parties realize that Bushrod has it out
only for Albert, not Clarisse. If Albert’s gun jams, and he asks

142. Of course, it would not be illogical to allow B (the second party) to try to stop A,
though it might be bad policy. And even if B is not allowed (i.e., would not be justified) to stop
A, she might still warrant an excuse if she did. But to focus on B’s status is essentially to reprise
the human shield hypothetical discussed earlier. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
143. See supra notes 22–25 and accompanying text.
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Clarisse to hand over the sidearm she’s packing, the law’s internal
coherence would not be challenged were Clarisse criminally
prohibited from doing so. Whatever concerns may militate against
requiring the threatened victims of an assault to try to assess whether
safe retreat is possible before protecting themselves with defensive
force do not also apply to bystanders who could be expected to be
able more coolly to assess the situation. Or so lawmakers may
reasonably conclude. So the fact that Albert has a justification
defense does not necessarily imply that Clarisse would also be legally
justified were she to aid him in assaulting Bushrod. Perhaps her legal
duty should be to encourage Albert to make use of the safe retreat
that they both realize exists.
Of course, this might be seen as evidence that Albert’s defense is
only an excuse, and not a justification as I had earlier claimed. If
Albert is only excused, then Clarisse’s lack of a defense would only
confirm the necessary implication thesis. The problem is that
although Clarisse might be denied a defense, she needn’t be. A
criminal code that permitted all third parties to assist persons who are
themselves permitted to resist unlawful force would hardly be
unintelligible or internally contradictory. So the necessary implication
thesis is still shown to be invalid. Again, this is a drafting issue, not a
conceptual one. Policy judgments about what should be done with
third parties have no bearing on the conceptual distinction between
justification and excuse.
B. Classifying the Defenses
It is a common move among criminal law theorists—especially
those advancing arguments for law reform—to try to demonstrate
that a particular defense is properly classified either as a justification
or as an excuse. To take just one example, a major symposium on
“battered women who kill” was explicitly shaped by the premise that
we can best determine how such women should fare under the
criminal law only after we first make clear whether self-defense is a
144
justification or an excuse. This last Section explores how this
enterprise should proceed if the revised conception of justification
and excuse I’ve proposed is correct. How ought we to categorize the
standard defenses such as necessity, duress, duress of circumstances,

144. See Symposium, Self Defense and Relations of Domination: Moral and Legal
Perspectives on Battered Women Who Kill, 57 U. PITT. L. REV. 461 (1996).
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defense of self, defense of others, and defense of property? Which are
justifications, and which are excuses?
1. Some Cautionary Notes. A classificatory enterprise of this sort
is risky, for the unarticulated assumption that all the particular rules
that fall within one of the broad doctrinal categories must be
classified alike is simply false. I have already indicated that the
categories of justification and excuse are straddled by statutes that do
not preclude use of the duress defense when the defendant who is
145
confronted with a powerful threat actually chooses the lesser evil.
When the actor commits a lesser evil than the evil that would have
resulted (by natural forces or by human agency) were he to have
acted otherwise, then he is presumably justified. When, even though
he selected the greater evil, he is granted a defense because a person
of reasonable firmness could not have been expected to have done
otherwise, then he is most likely excused.146 Furthermore, the defenses
involving defensive force are likely to be complex amalgams of
147
justifications and excuses. Perhaps, for instance, use of deadly force
to protect oneself from physical attack is justified, but to protect
oneself from robbery is only excused. Or use of force is excused when
retreat is possible, but justified where retreat is impossible. Or,
unavoidable mistakes are justified, whereas (merely) reasonable
mistakes are excused.
To see this point more clearly, it might be useful first to identify
the different defenses. Quick: How many are there? Although the
precise number will vary from code to code, I’d predict that many
people would guess around a dozen. Here, for example, is a list of
defenses one might generate from a glance at the Model Penal Code:
(involuntary) intoxication, duress, military orders, consent (by the
victim), de minimis infraction, entrapment, choice of (lesser) evils,
execution of public duty, use of force in self-protection, use of force
for the protection of other persons, use of force for the protection of
property, use of force in law enforcement, use of force by persons

145. See supra note 64; see also Greenawalt, supra note 22, at 16 (identifying duress as an
example of a defense that “reach[es] instances of both justification and excuse”).
146. More precisely, whether he is justified or excused in this latter event depends upon
one’s view of what the criminal law should (nominally) demand of members of the public. For
elaboration of this issue see infra notes 172–76 and accompanying text.
147. This is not to agree with those who say that all defenses contain elements of
justification and excuse. See, e.g., Gardner, supra note 14, at 122. As I have conceived
justifications and excuses, this is not so.
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with special responsibility for care, discipline or safety of others,
148
mental disease or defect, and immaturity. That’s fifteen.
If we look more carefully at any one of these provisions,
however, the picture changes. Take, for instance, Model Penal Code
section 3.06, “Use of Force for Protection of Property.” This lengthy
section expressly distinguishes among a large number of variables:
whether the property protected is movable, real, or a dwelling;
whether the force used is deadly, nondeadly, consists of confinement,
or is executed by “device”; whether the actor did or did not request
desistance before employing force; and (because it is expressly made
subject to a separate provision, section 3.09) whether the actor
149
behaved reasonably, negligently, or recklessly. This one section,
then, could be seen actually to consist of scores of discrete rules.150 For
example:
•
An actor may use nondeadly force against the person of
another when the actor reasonably believes that such force is
immediately necessary to prevent or terminate the unlawful
carrying away of tangible, movable property, provided that
such movable property is in his possession and the actor first
requests the person against whom such force is used to desist
151
from his interference with the property.
•
In any prosecution for which negligence does not suffice to
establish culpability, an actor may use nondeadly force
against the person of another, without first requesting the
person against whom such force is used to desist from his
interference with the property in question, when the actor
nonrecklessly believes that such force is immediately
necessary to prevent or terminate the unlawful carrying away
of tangible, movable property, that the property is in the

148. These are the personal (i.e., non-systemic) defenses of the general part. The list would
be greatly expanded were we to include (a) “defenses” that merely negative the prosecution’s
prima facie case (e.g., alibi or somnambulism), or (b) defenses particular to specific offenses
(e.g., “the spousal defense” recognized in some jurisdictions to sexual assaults). For a much
longer list that includes these sorts of defenses, see 1 ROBINSON, supra note 13, at 70.
149. MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.09 (1962).
150. On the difficulties of rule individualization, see, for example, A.M. Honoré, Real Laws,
in LAW, MORALITY, AND SOCIETY 99, 111 (P.M.S. Hacker & J. Raz eds., 1977) (raising the
possibility that “every prima-facie universal proposition of law which may be the subject of
debate is a separate rule”).
151. MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 3.06(1)(a), (3)(a)(ii).
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possession of another person for whose protection he acts,
152
and that such request would be useless.
•
In any prosecution for which recklessness does not suffice to
establish culpability, an actor may use deadly force against
the person of another if he believes that the other person is
attempting to dispossess him of his dwelling otherwise than
153
under a claim of right to its possession.
If these are “rules,” however, so too could each be called a
“defense”—respectively, the defenses of, say, “Reasonable use of
nondeadly force for the prevention of interference with movable
property belonging to oneself,” “Non-reckless use of nondeadly force
for the prevention of interference with movable property belonging
to another, prior request thought useless,” and “Use of deadly force
for protection against dispossession of dwelling.” And if sections are
carved up into more granular defenses in this fashion, the total
number of defenses recognized by the Model Penal Code would
easily reach into the hundreds.
Of course, it would be foolish for any penal code to list each such
defense separately. Some sort of groupings are called for. However,
no single way to organize the defenses is natural or transparently
correct. The code drafters could, for example, group defenses under
such headings as “Defenses involving use of deadly force,” “Defenses
involving use of nondeadly force,” and “Defenses not involving use of
force.” Or perhaps the hundreds of defenses could be classified
according to the relationship between the actor’s beliefs and objective
reality made relevant by the offense under which he is charged. Here
we might have five separate categories of defenses: “Defenses that do
not rely upon factual error,” “Defenses relying upon nonnegligent
error,” “Defenses relying upon negligence,” “Defenses relying upon
recklessness,” and “Defenses entailing substantial divergence from
reality.”
As we have seen, the drafters of the Model Penal Code chose the
mostly familiar categories mentioned above—duress, entrapment,
choice of lesser evils, use of force in self-protection, use of force for
the protection of property, and the like. And, all in all, it seems like a
sensible enough decision. What is not sensible, though, is for theorists
to then expect that these groupings of defenses would be wholly
subsumable under the different categorizing scheme of justification
152.
153.

Id.
Id. § 3.06(3)(d)(i).
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and excuse. In fact, it may be impossible to authoritatively classify
even individual discrete defenses as justification or excuse, partly
because classification is itself an interpretive act, not purely an
154
inquiry into historical facts, and partly because, more mundanely, a
defense might exist because some legislators deemed it a justification
155
and others thought it an excuse. But even if each granular defense
could be identified as either a justification or an excuse, to expect
larger groupings of defenses to line up neatly under the headings of
justification and excuse—to suppose, in other words, that existing
defense categories (such as duress or self-defense) relate to the
conceptual categories of justification and excuse as token to type, or
as species to genus156—is bizarre. This is something like inventorying
all the items in your house, classifying them by color, and then
expecting each category of items to be classifiable as a unit within a
distinct taxonomic scheme. It could happen, say, that all your reds are
edible and all your yellows inedible, but it would be nothing short of
marvelous.
Take the above defenses culled from the Model Penal Code’s
omnibus protection-of-property defense, MPC section 3.06. What I’ve
labeled “Reasonable use of nondeadly force for the prevention of
interference with movable property belonging to oneself” sure looks
like a justification: the state is probably intending to permit
individuals to use nondeadly force when they reasonably believe it
necessary in such circumstances. But whether the same is true for
“Non-reckless use of nondeadly force for the prevention of
interference with movable property belonging to another, prior
request thought useless” is less certain. Perhaps the MPC drafters
would have liked to prohibit individuals from protecting movable
property with force before requesting desistance, except where the
actor believes that such a request “would be dangerous to himself or

154. See Dan-Cohen, supra note 60, at 631 n.13:
The taxonomic distinction between conduct rules and decision rules should not be
taken to imply the existence of a single identifiable source of legal norms, a source
whose actual intentions determine the segregation of the norms into the two
categories. Rather, the classification of legal rules is a scheme of interpretation based
on the values and policies that the interpreter ascribes to the legal system . . . . That a
legislature in fact entertained certain intentions may, but need not, be reason to
ascribe particular values to the legislation.
155. See, e.g., Greenawalt, supra note 22, at 18–19.
156. Douglas N. Husak, The Serial View of Criminal Law Defenses, 3 CRIM. L.F. 369, 371
n.11 (1992).
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157
another person,” but also believed it unjust or unwise to punish
those who didn’t first request desistance simply because they thought
it useless. Were that the case, the defense might more properly be
deemed an excuse.
In short, the justification/excuse taxonomy and the taxonomy
created by existing doctrinal categories operate on different principles
of organization. One operates at a fairly high level of conceptual
abstraction, the other turns upon factors closer to actual human
experience. There is thus little reason to suspect that either is
subsumed under the other. Any single taxonomy that mixes these two
types of organizing rubrics (like that sketched in Figure 4), therefore,
is at best no more than suggestive. At worst, it must be conceded,
158
such a taxonomy threatens to confuse.

2. Duress and Provocation. Notwithstanding these caveats, we
can hazard some classificatory remarks. On the account here
presented, for instance, duress looks like a paradigmatic excuse. DanCohen explains the rationale clearly, deeming it
obvious that the policies advanced by the defense would lead to its
use as a decision rule—an instruction to the judge that defendants
who under duress committed acts that would otherwise amount to
offenses should not be punished. Just as obviously, no comparable
rule would be included among the conduct rules of the system:
knowledge of the existence of the defense of duress would not be
permitted to shape individual conduct; conduct would be guided
159
exclusively by the relevant criminal proscriptions.

On this account, and for other reasons that are assimilable to it,
that duress is an excuse has become common wisdom. In a
provocative recent article, however, Peter Westen and James

157. MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.06(3)(a)(ii). Subsection (3)(a)(i), recall, extends the defense
to persons who do not first request desistance for the seemingly less compelling reason that they
believe “such request would be useless.”
158. This is to take issue with the “premise . . . that a single legal doctrine, especially one in
the criminal arena, should be justified in terms of a single philosophical rationale.” Claire O.
Finkelstein, Duress: A Philosophical Account of the Defense in Law, 37 ARIZ. L. REV. 251, 252
(1995). The premise would be plausible (though I am not myself convinced) when applied to a
truly granular doctrine, one that cannot be sensibly subdivided into identifiably distinct rules.
But even that plausibility is lost, I think, once we recognize that what is generally taken to be “a
single legal doctrine”—like self-defense—may encompass more than one discrete legal rule.
159. Dan-Cohen, supra note 60, at 633.
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160
Mangiafico contend that duress is actually a justification. Their
subtle argument arises in response to what they deem “[t]he central
challenge” of being able “to explain why defenses of duress . . .
provide actors with greater protection against manmade threats than
defenses of necessity provide against natural threats.”161 If, for
example, a driver runs over and kills two people asleep on the road
because a gunman sitting beside her threatens to kill her unless she
proceeds straight ahead, the driver may win exculpation on grounds
162
of duress. In contrast, the driver has no defense if she runs over the
same two people because hazardous road conditions left her with the
only alternative under the circumstances of driving off the road and
over a precipice to her certain death. Necessity is unavailable in this
latter case because in killing two to save just herself she did not
choose “the lesser evil.” Duress is unavailable because it ordinarily
extends only to manmade threats.163
Almost all commentators, Westen and Mangiafico observe, both
view duress as an excuse and maintain that this disparity is
164
indefensible. “Conservatives” would deny the defense in the
gunman case; “liberals” would extend it to the hazardous road case.165
But maybe, the authors argue, the law is wiser than we are. Perhaps
criticisms of the disparate treatment that duress law affords manmade
and natural threats

on the part of conservative and liberal commentators are the
product of a common fallacy—a fallacy concerning the standard by
which “evils” are measured for purposes of the choice-of-evils
defense. The standard by which evils are measured is not one that
places evils in a single ranked order for all purposes. Rather, the

160. Peter Westen & James Mangiafico, The Defense of Criminal Duress: A Justification,
Not an Excuse—and Why it Matters, 6 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. (forthcoming 2003) (manuscript at
103, on file with the Duke Law Journal).
161. Id. (manuscript at 101).
162. This assumes that the jurisdiction does not categorically disallow duress as a defense in
cases of homicide. Obviously, the disparity between manmade and natural threats that this and
the following hypothetical together exemplify does not depend upon the defendant’s being
charged with a homicidal offense. These examples were introduced in SANFORD H. KADISH &
MONROE G. PAULSEN, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES 570–71 (3d ed. 1975). I have
discussed them in Berman, supra note 51, at 63–64.
163. See, e.g., supra note 77 (quoting MPC § 2.09(1)).
164. See Westen & Mangiafico, supra note 160 (manuscript at 102–03).
165. See id. (manuscript at 130) (“Conservatives wish to confine the defense to an actor’s
response to unlawful manmade threats . . . . Liberals in turn wish to expand the defense . . . to
natural threats that persons of reasonable firmness would be unable to resist.”).
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appropriate standard is a moralized or “contextualized” one that is
capable of ranking the same evils differently, depending upon the
relationships among the parties and the causal nature of resulting
166
harms.

Because evils are contextualized in this way, Westen and
Mangiafico contend, when the law affords the driver a valid duress
defense in the gunman case, it is because the driver has in fact chosen
167
the lesser of two evils. And if so, then duress is a justification, not an
168
excuse. At the same time, contextualization also means that the law
is not committed to agreeing that the driver chose the lesser evil,
169
hence should be entitled to a defense, in the road hazard case.
The first thing to notice about this argument is that the
contextualization hypothesis does not itself defeat the view that there
exists some subset of the duress defense that is an excuse. Suppose, as
the contextualization hypothesis would hold, that the scope of the
(justificatory) necessity defense is broader in cases of responses to
manmade threats than in response to natural threats. At some point,
however, a defendant will commit a criminal wrong in response to a
manmade threat that the law deems not sufficient to make his
conduct the choice of a lesser evil, but in which the pressure was
substantial. The duress-as-an-excuse crowd will say that there exists a
non-null set of cases within this space in which a defense should be
granted. It is this set of cases that we mean by duress. When
characterizing duress as an excuse, that is to say, we have in mind that
extension of the defense which does not also qualify as choosing the
lesser evil.
To this, Westen and Mangiafico have two responses. The first
170
returns us to the “central challenge” of justifying the disparate
treatment in duress law for manmade and natural threats. According
to Westen and Mangiafico, (1) defenders of the excuse
characterization of duress cannot justify this disparity, and (2) the
disparity is appropriate.171 But each of these claims is vulnerable.
With respect, it’s not clear from the Westen and Mangiafico
article what supports proposition (2) beyond the authors’ own
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.

Id. (manuscript at 103).
Id. (manuscript at 102–03).
Id. (manuscript at 103).
Id. (manuscript at 103–04).
Id. (manuscript at 101).
Id. (manuscript at 103–04).
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intuitions, supported by faith in the immanent logic of the common
law. Furthermore, even if the law has gotten things right, those who
characterize duress as an excuse can rely on fairly common secondorder considerations to both explain and justify the existing disparity.
The argument, in a small nutshell, is that notwithstanding first-order
“liberal” sorts of reasons to codify a defense of situational duress that
would cover some set of cases in which the defendant did not choose
the lesser evil, systemic worries about the potential for abuse of the
defense, false negatives, judicial efficiency, and the like, militate
against it. For example, a defense of situational duress might threaten
to allow every poor defendant charged with a property offense to
reach a jury on his argument that life circumstances—of a force that
reasonable people might find irresistible—”pressed” or “compelled”
or “coerced” him into committing his criminal act. Surely the law
might reasonably conclude that this would be intolerable
notwithstanding the force of the “liberal” logic.
This leads to Westen and Mangiafico’s remaining argument. A
defendant should be excused on grounds of duress, they observe, only
172
if she has acted in some sense reasonably. Moreover, this standard
of reasonableness must be somehow moralized, not purely
173
statistical. But if a defendant has acted in a morally reasonable way
in acceding to a given threat, they conclude, then her conduct must be
considered legally justified, not merely excused. “[A]n action that
exhibits the ‘courage and commitment that the law can properly
demand of us’ is not excused action. It is action that the law regards
as tolerable, and hence action that is ultimately justified.”174
This, it seems to me, is the only argument Westen and
Mangiafico marshal that directly challenges the excuse
175
characterization of duress. Yet I think it does not succeed. Certainly
it is logically possible for the law sometimes to tell its addressees that
they must act with more than a morally adequate degree of firmness.
172. See, e.g., MPC § 2.09(1), quoted supra note 77.
173. See Westen & Mangiafico, supra note 160 (manuscript at 175–76) (“The term
‘reasonable firmness’ . . . . holds actors to the firmness—the steadfastness to avoid
wrongdoing—that the law believes they ought to possess under the circumstances.”).
174. Id. (manuscript at 216) (quoting R.A. Duff, Virtue, Vice, and Criminal Liability: Do We
Want an Aristotelian Criminal Law?, 6 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 147, 177 (2002)).
175. The conceptualization thesis, recall, need entail only that the justificatory necessity
defense should be broader in cases of manmade threats than in cases of natural threats. And the
law’s refusal to extend any defense to situational duress not amounting to the choice of a lesser
evil can be explained and justified on second-order concerns that are reconcilable with the
concession-to-human-frailty view of duress that would render it an excuse.
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That is, the law could conceive of its own substantive, action-directing
norms as sometimes demanding something closer to moral heroism.
In this event, somebody who commits a prima facie criminal offense
only because she has given in to substantial pressures (say, in the
form of a do-it-or-else command issued by another) has violated the
criminal law even all-things-considered, hence is not legally justified.
And yet, if the law chooses not to punish people it deems not morally
blameworthy, then the fact (if true) that our offender has exhibited
morally reasonable firmness might sensibly translate into a conclusion
that she is not morally blameworthy, hence legally excused. To the
extent that legal excuse piggybacks upon or incorporates moral
excuse, then the defendant’s being not morally blameworthy ipso
facto renders her legally excused, even though the law’s decision to
demand (in the substance of its forward-looking norms) more than
mere non-blameworthiness denies her legal justification.
In short, so long as the forward-looking norms of the criminal
law can be more demanding than are the backward-looking moral
norms of proper blame ascription, there appears no reason to deny
that the criminal law can recognize a subset of duress that is not also
the choice of a lesser evil or that any such defense counts as an excuse
for purposes of legal taxonomy. The conventional wisdom that duress
is an excuse therefore withstands the Westen and Mangiafico
challenge.
Proper classification of the provocation “defense”—i.e., the rule
of law that intentional homicides committed under certain sorts of
“heat of passion” qualify as voluntary manslaughter instead of, as
they would be but for the provocation, murder—is much more
controversial. According to the majority view, provocation is a partial
excuse—an “indulgence,” as one influential nineteenth-century
176
decision put it, “to the frailty of human nature.” A minority view
characterizes it as a justification. As Andrew Ashworth explains,
[t]his is not to argue that it is ever morally right to kill a person who
does wrong. Rather, the claim implicit in partial justification is that
an individual is to some extent morally justified in making a punitive
return against someone who intentionally causes him serious
offence, and that this serves to differentiate someone who is

176. Maher v. People, 10 Mich. 212, 219 (1862). The secondary literature defending this
vision is large. For the most recent contribution by one of the leading defenders of the partialexcuse view, see Joshua Dressler, Why Keep the Provocation Defense?: Some Reflections on a
Difficult Subject, 86 MINN. L. REV. 959 (2002).
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provoked to lose his self-control and kill from the unprovoked
killer . . . . The complicity of the victim cannot and should not be
ignored, for the blameworthiness of his conduct has a strong bearing
on the court’s judgment of the seriousness of the provocation and
177
the reasonableness of the accused’s failure to control himself.

If the above account of duress is correct, however, the very same
sorts of reasons would seem to render provocation an excuse too.
Most plausibly understood, I suggest, mitigation for provoked
homicides is not part of the substantive, forward-looking normativity
of the criminal law, but rather is a backward-looking inquiry into the
just extent of the given defendant’s punishability. It amounts, as
Herbert Wechsler explained in defense of the Model Penal Code’s
expansion of common law provocation principles,178 “to a plea in
mitigation based upon a mental or emotional trauma of significant
179
dimensions, with the jury asked to show whatever empathy it can.”
The criminal law should not be understood as advising one poised to
kill in a heat of passion that doing so might be partially excused or
partially justified, or that it could bring forth a reduced sentence
relative to some sort of empirical or intuited baselines. Rather, the
criminal law’s prohibitory norm, I should think, seeks to realize itself
in unequivocal terms: “Do not kill this person, no matter how
inflamed your passions may be, and no matter how justifiably you
may be aggrieved.”
If and when that norm is violated, however, it then turns to the
state to determine how much punishment is due. And at that stage the
law may conclude that the circumstances surrounding the defendant’s
conduct render her deserving of less punishment than would be the
situation otherwise. Is this merely because she had “lost control”? I
don’t think so. As Dan Kahan and Martha Nussbaum persuasively
argue, the emotions that caused the defendant to experience a muchdiminished capacity for rational self-control are themselves proper
180
subjects of moral evaluation. It is a necessary condition for
mitigation to be deemed appropriate that the defendant had lost
177. A.J. Ashworth, The Doctrine of Provocation, 35 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 292, 307–08 (1976)
(footnote omitted).
178. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.3(1)(b) (1962) (providing that “a homicide which
would otherwise be murder” is manslaughter if “committed under the influence of extreme
mental or emotional disturbance for which there is reasonable explanation or excuse”).
179. Herbert Wechsler, Codification of Criminal Law in the United States: The Model Penal
Code, 68 COLUM. L. REV. 1425, 1446 (1968).
180. This is the central thesis of Kahan & Nussbaum, supra note 12.
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some capacity to control her thoughts and actions. But it is not
sufficient. If the ultimate measure of an actor’s blameworthiness is the
degree to which she fails to manifest appropriate regard for right
values and interests, then to lose control because, say, one hates gay
people can, and should, be assessed differently than to lose control
181
because one is angry at an injury done to one’s child.
Aha!, defenders of the partial-justification conception of
provocation might retort, isn’t this simply to say “that an individual is
to some extent morally justified in making a punitive return against
182
someone who intentionally causes him serious offense”? Perhaps.
But that is not to the point. The question is not (as Ashworth’s
argument seems to imply) whether the intentional killer with a
paradigmatic provocation claim is not only less morally blameworthy
than would be the case but for the provocation, but also has acted less
morally wrongfully. The question—or what is generally taken to be
the question—is whether the provocation claim is better classified for
purposes of the internal taxonomy of the criminal law as a partial
excuse or as a partial justification.
And if my account of legal justification is correct, then to classify
provocation as a partial (legal) justification is not only to believe that
defendants who have a valid provocation defense are partially
morally justified (a matter with respect to which I’m agnostic), but
also to assume that statutory punishments for serious crimes like
intentional homicides are part of the regime’s conduct rules. Put
another way, it is to assume that the criminal punishment to be
183
administered for voluntary manslaughter is a price, not a sanction.
But even if some criminal penalties are properly conceived of as
prices, that the penalties available for intentional homicides would be
among them is exceedingly implausible. If this is right, then the
reduction in penalty that a valid provocation claim buys exists as part
181. Id. at 312–15 & nn.183–84 (contrasting Commonwealth v. Carr, 580 A.2d 1362, 1364
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1990) with People v. Shields, 575 N.E.2d 538, 546 (Ill. 1991)). Kahan and
Nussbaum proceed to contend that provocation is neither justification nor excuse. Id. at 318–19.
Provocations cannot be partial justifications, they believe, because “[j]ustifications are said to
identify acts that produce morally preferred states of affairs.” Id. And they can’t be partial
excuses because excuses “are concerned with how the defendant’s particular circumstances
affected her capacity or opportunity to obey the law.” Id. at 319. Of course, I believe that here
the authors go awry by assuming too uncritically what I have argued are incorrect conceptions
of these legal categories.
182. See supra note 177 and accompanying text.
183. For the classic comparison between price and sanction see Robert Cooter, Prices and
Sanctions, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1523 (1984).
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of the criminal law’s backward-looking rules of responsibility, not as
part of its forward-looking, conduct-guiding norms. Legally speaking,
therefore, it is a partial excuse, not a partial justification,
notwithstanding that a defendant might be deemed entitled to this
excuse in part because her conduct was partially justified, morally
184
speaking.
CONCLUSION
I have argued here that the distinction, for purposes of the
criminal law, between justification and excuse has no necessary
185
substantive relationship to moral wrongfulness. Instead, the roles
that justifications and excuses play in the criminal law are only
structurally equivalent to the roles they play in moral reasoning:
justification defenses qualify the offenses to provide that certain
conduct is not criminal, all things considered; excuse defenses specify
the circumstances under which an offender cannot be punished for
having violated the criminal law. This might seem a weak claim,
entailing nothing in particular about the concrete disputes that have
so vigorously engaged scholars for the past twenty-five years. But that
is always true of conceptual, or analytical, studies. As the philosopher
C.L. Stevenson explained, “[t]he purpose of an analytic or
methodological study, whether of science or ethics [or law, we might
add], is . . . to send others to their tasks with clearer heads and less
wasteful habits of investigation.”186 Moreover, to say that a proper
understanding of justification and excuse entails no particular
conclusions to a variety of substantive disputes is, in fact, to say

184. See also Dressler, supra note 176, at 962 (“It is a partial excuse based on the actor’s
partial loss of self-control, although (and here is where confusion lies) the reason for the actor’s
loss of self-control sometimes (but not always) has a justificatory-type component.”).
185. A final caveat: Justifications and excuses within the criminal law may have a necessary
substantive relationship to their counterparts in ordinary morality if all of law has a necessary
substantive relationship to morality. Whether that is so, and if so, what the nature of that
relationship is, are the central questions of the main branch of contemporary jurisprudence and
cannot be explored with any seriousness here. But let me caution against a too complacent
assumption that the theoretical claims within any particular field of law are ultimately hostage
to the (yet more abstract) theoretical claims about law, full stop. The relationship, rather, is one
of mutual interdependence. Thus, were it to turn out that the thesis presented here is
compatible (in part or in toto) only with a particular variety of positivism, then just as
arguments against that variety of positivism would count against the instant thesis (or some part
thereof), so too would arguments in support of the present thesis count against the competing
theories of law.
186. C.L. STEVENSON, ETHICS AND LANGUAGE 1 (1944).
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something of importance. What follows is a radical skepticism of all
arguments that purport to derive any necessary shape for the positive
criminal law from the justification/excuse distinction itself. By
showing just how thin is the conceptual distinction between the
defenses of justification and excuse (even if the contents of the two
categories are driven by considerations that are substantive to the
criminal law, not just formal), I hope to prod scholars to argue for
their favored articulations of particular defenses (like particular
offenses) in terms of good policy broadly conceived—justice, fairness,
efficiency, administrability, and the like—not in terms of conceptual
or logical truths.
When embarking upon these tasks, to be sure, theorists and law
reformers may find it extremely useful to think hard about what
makes conduct morally justifiable and about when conduct that is not
morally justifiable is nonetheless morally excusable. This is because
no minimally just regime of criminal law can treat these judgments
with indifference. It is a different matter entirely to try to separate the
“legally justifiable” from the “legally excusable.” The case for the
wisdom in that still has not been made.

